


JPRS-TND-93-011
23 April 1993



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-011

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23 April 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Disagreement Over Amendments to Nuclear Energy Act

MB1804132893 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES
in English 18 Apr 93 Business Times Supplement p 1

[By Ciaran Ryan: "AEC in nuclear secrets wrangle"]

[Text] A row has broken out over proposed amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act which grants the Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC] sweeping powers and secrecy.

Industry sources say the AEC, which is being partly commercialised, is given unfair advantages over competitors.

One source says AEC drafted the amendments in the hope that it would pass quietly into law. This is refuted by AEC chief executive Waldo Stumpf. "This is only a draft and we are inviting comment," he says.

The amendments retain some of the secrecy provisions of the existing act, which were used by AEC executives to hide the corporation's involvement in the production of nuclear bombs. The new Act outlaws nuclear bomb production.

"This is a bossy piece of paper," says Johan Kruger, an energy specialist at the Bernard Price Institute at Wits. "The AEC wants to retain all the power and remain in control. The Council for Nuclear Safety should be carrying out many of the functions allocated to the AEC. Who's going to police the AEC?"

The Act would give the AEC powers of search and seizure, giving rise to fears that this could be used against competitors.

The Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs cannot rule on many aspects of nuclear energy without consulting the AEC. If enacted, some of the AEC's activities would not be subject to review by any court of law.

The independent Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS), to which AEC reports, is charged with regulating the industry. Yet AEC—not the CNS—is empowered to carry out search and seizure operations and to enforce international nuclear agreements signed by SA.

Dr Stumpf says the proposed Act is closely modelled on similar overseas acts, where secrecy clauses are designed to prevent leakages of sensitive information.

He says for reasons of practicality, AEC officials will continue to liaise with the IAEA. "We have been dealing with them all along, but in theory anyone could do it."

AEC embarked on a commercialisation drive in 1990 to reduce its dependence on State subsidies, but it will remain exempt from the provisions of the Companies Act.

AEC, supported by government by about R[ands]470-million this year, is exempted from income tax should it make a profit. Dr Stumpf says he is willing to consider reviewing the amendment so that AEC falls within the ambit of the Companies Act.

AEC has a monopoly over the production of nuclear energy in SA. The proposed law gives AEC sweeping powers over anyone involved in nuclear research.

Dr Stumpf says this is necessary because SA is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Safeguards Agreement (NPT), which is aimed at forestalling non-peaceful use of nuclear materials.

Competitors will be required to allow the AEC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect their premises and seize materials.

In terms of the existing 1982 Act, and now the proposed amendment, competitors will be required to submit to AEC details of patents where these relate to nuclear energy.

The AEC has the power, through the Registrar of Patents, to block the patent indefinitely while keeping secret its contents.

Russian Scientists To Cooperate in Nuclear Reactor Research*OW1904104093 Beijing XINHUA in English 1030 GMT 19 Apr 93*

[Text] Chengdu, April 19 (XINHUA)—Russia will send 10 scientists to China to jointly conduct nuclear research, according to an international symposium for peaceful use of nuclear power concluded on April 17 in Chengdu of southwest China's Sichuan Province.

The Russian scientists will be engaged in the conceptual design of a fusion-fission hybrid reactor and feasibility research on the concerned technology.

The hybrid reactor is a kind of economical nuclear production device which may solve the shortage of nuclear power in the next century.

China has listed hybrid reactor research under the state's hi-tech development program. China has now completed the concept designs of an engineering test breeder, mirror hybrid reactor, tokamak engineering test breeder and commercial hybrid reactor.

During the Sino-Russia symposium for the peaceful use of nuclear power held April 12-17, the scientists held discussions on blanket technology, neutronics design, nuclear waste disposal and environmental safety analysis.

Beijing, Moscow To Cooperate on Hybrid Reactor*OW1904143893 Beijing XINHUA in English 1432 GMT 19 Apr 93*

[Text] Chengdu, April 19 (XINHUA)—China and Russia will enhance their co-operation in the study of a hybrid reactor.

Russia will send a group of ten experts to work in China for two and half years, according to an international seminar on the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy which ended here yesterday.

Hybrid reactors denote fusion-fission reactors. These are economic nuclear fuel production devices, which, it is hoped, will solve the energy problem in the next century.

The hybrid reactor is also an useful device for processing nuclear waste.

In 1986 China enlisted the study of hybrid reactors in the state development programs.

So far, China has completed the concept designs for a mirror hybrid reactor, a Tokamak Engineering Test Breeder (TETB), a TETB-II and a commercial hybrid reactor.

In 1990 China and Russia started their co-operation on the study of hybrid reactors, and the two countries have held two seminars on the subject respectively in Moscow, capital of Russia, and Hefei, capital of east China's Anhui Province.

The Chengdu seminar was held from April 14 to 17 and focused on topics such as blanket technology, neutronics design, nuclear waste disposal, plasma core physics, environment safety analysis and nuclear production devices.

Qian Qichen, ROK Foreign Minister Discuss Nuclear Issue*OW2104132893 Beijing XINHUA in English 1314 GMT 21 Apr 93*

[Text] Bangkok, April 21 (XINHUA)—Both China and the Republic of Korea believe that the strengthening of relations between the two countries are in conformity with the interests of the peoples of the two countries and are of great importance to the stability of Northeast Asia.

These remarks were made here this afternoon by Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea Han Sung-chu when the two met to discuss issues of common concern.

During their meeting, according to a Chinese official, the two sides recalled the fast development of bilateral relations since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries last August.

Qian and Han also exchanged views on the current situation on the Korean peninsula and the Chinese vice premier pointed out that China hopes the situation on the Korean peninsula will be relaxed and stable.

Qian said that China, as always, supports the proposal that the Korean peninsula be free of nuclear weapons of any kind.

On the issue of nuclear inspections, Qian said China is in favour of solving this issue properly through consultations among all parties concerned.

Both Qian and Han are here to attend the 49th annual session of the UN Economic and Social Commission which began its nine-day meeting today.

After meeting with Han, Qian also met with Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Koji Kakizawa and the two exchanged views on issues of mutual concern.

IAEA Urged To Probe Nuclear Threat in Tibet**Exiles Says Nuclear Threat Real***BK1904122093 Hong Kong AFP in English 1202 GMT 19 Apr 93*

[Text] NEW DELHI, April 19 (AFP)—Tibet's government-in-exile urged the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on Monday to send a mission to Tibet, accusing China of turning the region into a "major nuclear threat."

The demand came after the release of a report by the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet tracing the history and role of the "Ninth Academy," an alleged top secret nuclear facility built on the Tibetan plateau.

Tashi Wangdi, foreign minister of the exile government based in the northern Indian town of Dharamsala, said the report had confirmed "what we have suspected and feared for the last three decades."

"China has created a major nuclear threat in Tibet."

The report alleges deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons in at least three sites on the Tibetan plateau and unregulated dumping of radioactive nuclear waste.

In a statement, Wangdi said the report showed that Beijing could no longer deny allegations that it had engaged in "secret nuclear programmes and in dumping of radioactive waste" in Tibet.

The Chinese nuclear activity threatened to push Asia into becoming a "nuclear danger zone," he warned.

"China's own nuclear programme and its support to Pakistani, Iranian and North Korean programmes will jeopardise the security of many Asian countries, and may eventually force countries in the region to develop their own nuclear devices."

Wangdi said the IAEA should immediately send a mission to Tibet to verify the allegations.

The exile government headed by the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, is not recognised by any country.

The Dalai Lama and nearly 100,000 of his followers have lived in India since fleeing Tibet after an abortive anti-Chinese revolt in 1959.

Beijing Denies Nuclear Center in Tibet

HK1904103293 Hong Kong AFP in English 1017 GMT 19 Apr 93

[Text] Beijing, April 19 (AFP)—The Chinese government denied Monday the existence of a top-secret nuclear research centre and deploying nuclear weapons on the Tibetan plateau within striking distance of India.

The government's Nuclear Safety Administration also denied the deaths of 35 people near uranium mines cited in a report by the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). "This is impossible, I have never heard anything about this," an administration spokesman told AFP.

The Defence Ministry declined to comment on the report which said China had built a vast nuclear research centre on the Tibetan plateau where it had deployed nuclear weapons to bring India's major industrial and military facilities within striking distance of short-range missiles.

The ICT also alleges that China uses forced prison labour at the nuclear sites which threaten regional stability. It says at least 35 Tibetans died in one town from drinking contaminated water over the past three years.

Formed in 1988 to monitor human rights in Tibet, the ICT said its report was based on interviews with Chinese nuclear experts, government officials, two ICT fact-finding missions and Tibetans.

Delegate on Principles for Transparency in Arms Transfer

OW1304194193 Beijing XINHUA in English 1554 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] New Delhi, April 13 (XINHUA)—China today expressed its stand on transparency in arms transfer (TIAT) by spelling out eight principles for the issue.

Delivering a speech on the issue at the 89th inter-parliamentary conference which opened here on Monday [11 April], China's chief delegate Peng Qingyuan said that China is in favor of appropriate openness and transparency in arms transfer.

Peng, who is a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), said that all TIAT-related measures must be fair, reasonable and practicable.

"Therefore, China maintains that the following principles must be observed in pursuing TIAT," the Chinese delegate said.

- TIAT has to be conducive to building up international trust, easing international tensions and promoting peace and stability in the world.

- All TIAT measures must be conducive to maintaining and enhancing rather than jeopardizing or compromising nations' right to self defense and legitimate defense capabilities.

- Specific TIAT measures should be formulated jointly by all countries through consultations on an equal footing and subject to adjustment where called for by developments in the international situation and countries' changing requirements.

- The United Nations members should all strictly adhere to the UN charter and oppose and eliminate interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the use or threat of force in displays of hegemony and power politics.

- Countries with the largest and most advanced nuclear and conventional arsenals should lead in drastically reducing heavy and offensive weapons and making public information on their arsenals and the deployment of their forces.

- Countries should be allowed to opt for any TIAT measures as they see fit in their respective national conditions while being encouraged to take part in jointly agreed TIAT measures on the basis of equality.

- Bilateral and regional exchanges of military information, TIAT measures and related arrangements or unilateral efforts should be encouraged while the UN TIAT mechanism is promoted.

- Measures for limiting and controlling the military use of science and technology must not compromise or affect the peaceful use of advances in science and technology, by the developing countries in particular, or hamper international cooperation and exchanges.

The NPC Standing Committee ratified China's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last year, Peng said, adding that China has also signed the convention on chemical weapons.

China also welcomes the START II treaty reached by the United States and Russia and hopes it will be implemented in real earnest, he said.

State To 'Substantially' Hike Theoretical Physics Funding

OW1904072493 Beijing XINHUA in English 0716 GMT
19 Apr 93

[Text] Beijing, April 19 (XINHUA)—The Chinese Government has decided to increase substantially its financial support of the country's theoretical physicists in their efforts to solve some of the fundamental problems in nuclear physics, atomic physics, astronomical physics and cosmology.

Starting from this year, the National Natural Science Foundation of China will give one million yuan more money each year in its support of the country's theoretical physicists, according to researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) here today.

An academic committee led by Professors Peng Huanwu, Yu Min and He Zuoxiu has been set up to manage the special fund. Professors Peng, Yu and He, who are members of CAS, played a leading role in designing China's atomic and hydrogen bombs in the 1960s and '70s.

"Chinese theoretical physicists have made historical contributions to the country's national defense industry," said Professor He. "Now as China is focusing its attention on economic development, the country's theoretical physicists will continue to play an instructive and advisory role in China's economic construction and scientific and technological development."

Part of the special fund will go to the research work led and organized by Professors T.D. Lee and C.N. Yang, who are Nobel laureates in physics and are now teaching in the United States.

JAPAN

Nakasone Proposes Organization To Supervise Former Soviet Plutonium

OW1904065293 Tokyo KYODO in English 0544 GMT 19 Apr 93

[Text] Tokyo, April 19 KYODO—Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed Monday [19 April] the formation of an international organization capable of dismantling and storing plutonium from nuclear weapons in countries of the former Soviet Union.

Nakasone, in a keynote address at a symposium held at a Tokyo hotel on plutonium and the destruction of nuclear weapons, said he hopes proposals from the symposium will be reflected in the July meeting in Tokyo of the heads of the Group of Seven major industrial nations.

A total of 92 people from 15 countries are attending the symposium, which is jointly sponsored by Harvard University and the World Peace Research Institute which Nakasone chairs.

The symposium is expected to issue a joint policy statement on ways of dismantling nuclear weapons and the storage and management of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Criticizes U.S. Weapons Exports

SK1504105693 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1048 GMT 15 Apr 93

["Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, April 15 (KCNA)—A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement today.

Demanding that the United States take out of South Korea its large number of nuclear weapons and missiles, instead of slandering other country and trying to put pressure upon it, he says:

A spokesman of the U.S. State Department on April 9 alleged that the DPRK was scheming to manufacture a missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers and transfer it to Iran and cried that its "spread of missiles" must be checked.

The United States, which had been vociferous about the fictitious "suspicion of nuclear weapon development" against the DPRK, is now slinging mud at it over the "problem of spread of missiles." This vividly shows how persistently it is trying to isolate and stifle our socialism.

The whole world knows that the biggest manufacturer, exporter and disseminator of technology of nuclear weapons, missiles and other mass destruction weapons is none other than the United States.

It is nobody's secret that in 1991 alone it sold off to mid-east countries and nearly all countries of the world weapons of mass destruction worth over 41,000 million dollars.

Britain, France and many other countries are also exporting missiles.

It is to realise its foul ambition that the United States is slandering progressive countries with faked materials, not uttering a word about the fact that, it together with its allies, is exporting a large number of nuclear weapons and missiles and transferring their technology to other countries.

In the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as missiles, the United States is still resorting to "double standard" and the policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, its bad habit of the cold war era.

Such strong-arm action on the part of the United States cannot work anywhere and cannot avoid opposition from the world people in the present world where international justice and fairness must be ensured.

Foreign Ministry Response To U.S. Accusation

Missile Sale to Iran

SK1604020193 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0115 GMT 16 Apr 93

[Statement (tamhwa) by a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman released on 15 April—read by announcer]

[Text] A U.S. State Department spokesman babbled on 9 April that we were scheming to manufacture a missile with a range of 1,000 km and transfer it to Iran and said that our spread of missiles must be held in check.

The United States, which had been vociferous about the suspicion of our nonexistent nuclear weapon development, is now slandering us over the problem of the spread of missiles. This vividly shows how persistently it is trying to isolate and stifle [apsal] our socialism.

The whole world knows that the biggest manufacturer, exporter, and disseminator of technology of nuclear weapons, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction is none other than the United States.

It is no secret that in 1991 alone, it sold weapons of mass destruction worth over \$41 billion to Middle East countries and almost all the other countries of the world.

Britain, France, and many other countries are also exporting missiles.

To realize its insidious ambition, the United States is slandering with fabricated materials progressive countries, not uttering a word about the fact that, it, with its allies, is exporting a large number of nuclear weapons and missiles and transferring their technology to other countries.

In the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as missiles, the United States is still resorting to double standards and the policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, its bad habit from the cold war era.

Such strong-armed action by the United States cannot work anywhere and cannot avoid opposition and rejection from the people of the world in the present world where international justice and fairness must be ensured.

The United States must first take its large number of nuclear weapons and missiles out of South Korea, instead of slandering another country and trying to put pressure on it.

Denial of Reports

SK1704104993 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1037 GMT 17 Apr 93

[Text] Pyongyang, April 17 (KCNA)—Mass media of the United States and other Western countries are now spreading fantastic reports about "missile export" by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Quoting THE NEW YORK TIMES, Voice of America brought together the balderdash that North Korea intended to "sell medium-range missiles of new type" to Iran and they posed "threat" to the security of Middle East and Asia.

This is a totally unfounded mean propaganda and another round of the anti-DPRK smear campaign.

It is unimaginable for the DPRK which has made consistent efforts for world peace and security, regarding independence, peace and friendship as the basic idea of its foreign policy, to manufacture mass destruction weapons and export them.

It is none other than the United States that has struck a bonanza through a massive sale of nuclear weapons, missiles and other mass destruction weapons to other countries.

In the last decade alone, the U.S. imperialists have sold weapons worth 128 billion dollars to more than 120 countries in the form of "military aid".

It is a shameless act reminding us of a thief filing the suit first to talk loudly about the fictitious "missile export" by the DPRK, while keeping mum about the sale of nuclear weapons, missiles and other mass destruction weapons to countries in the Middle East and other regions by the United States with other Western imperialists.

It is an old practice of the U.S. imperialists who have got accustomed to the anti-DPRK smear campaign to slander it with fabrications.

When things went amiss in their outcries over "suspicion of nuclear development" against the DPRK based on lies the U.S. imperialists are now charging it with "missile export". This indicates how viciously they are trying to isolate and stifle Korean-style socialism centred on the popular masses.

It is a daydream for them to try to mislead public opinion and frighten the Korean people with false propaganda which cannot go down with anyone.

They must know clearly that any threat and high-handed act never work with the Korean people who regard independence as their life and soul and that they will only face denunciation from the world people.

The United States must give up the foolish intention to threaten the DPRK with fabrications and immediately withdraw its nuclear weapons and missiles from South Korea.

Diplomatic Source on High-Level Washington-Pyongyang Contact

Likely in May

SK2004081693 Seoul YONHAP in English 0749 GMT 20 Apr 93

[Text] Seoul, April 20 (YONHAP)—A high-level North Korea-U.S. contact is likely after the U.N. Security Council adopts its first resolution against Pyongyang around mid-May, a diplomatic source said Tuesday.

"Washington will be more justified in talking directly with Pyongyang, the 'carrot policy,' after the Security Council issues a strong-toned resolution," he said on condition of anonymity.

The Security Council had nearly completed the draft of the resolution on North Korea and was expected to adopt it around mid-May after full negotiations with China, which may be reluctant to join an international action against Pyongyang, he said.

The United States said for the first time last week it was ready for a high-level contact with North Korea.

Washington would negotiate the level and location of the contact with North Korea through Beijing, the source said.

"The United States is careful about whether to meet North Korea before or after the U.N. resolution. The consensus in the administration is that it is better to meet after the resolution as a way of building up justification for the direct high-level contact," he said.

Washington officials reacted negatively to Seoul's suggestion that the United States talk with North Korea, but those urging a carrot policy with Pyongyang had recently gained a stronger voice, he explained.

The North Korea-U.S. contact will be the deciding factor in solving Pyongyang's nuclear issue as it is the last major carrot before the international community takes stringent actions.

The hardline communist nation became the first country ever to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) when it retaliated against the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for demanding a special inspection of two highly suspect sites.

North Korea's NPT withdrawal becomes formal on June 12.

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu meets with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, on Wednesday to seek Beijing's cooperation in convincing North Korea to return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspections.

"Both North Korea and China have been demanding direct Pyongyang-Washington talks. Once the direct contact takes place, either North Korea will move positively on solving the nuclear stalemate or Beijing will no longer be justified in not joining U.N. moves against Pyongyang," the source said.

"China knows the U.S. intentions, and Qian is expected to indicate during Wednesday's meeting what actions Beijing will take on North Korea," he said.

Envoy to UN Urges High-Level Talks

SK2104020593 Seoul YONHAP in English 0153 GMT
21 Apr 93

[Text] Tokyo, April 21 (YONHAP)—North Korea has said that it would move to solve the nuclear issue if the United States accepted high-level Pyongyang-Washington talks, Japan's MAINICHI SHIMBUN newspaper reported Wednesday from the United Nations.

"The nuclear problem will be solved when North Korea-U.S. high-level negotiations begin," Ho Chong, North Korean deputy chief of mission to the United Nations, was quoted as saying in an interview with the MAINICHI.

"The high-level negotiations are between government representatives given authority by the governments of the two countries," Ho said.

Washington, in a change of mind, said last week that such direct contact with Pyongyang was possible. North Korea has long demanded high-level talks with the United States.

The deputy chief said there were five conditions that had to be met before North Korea would return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

First, the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise Team Spirit must stop; second, North Korea must be able to see military installations in the South; third, the United States must guarantee it will not launch a nuclear attack on North Korea; fourth, the United States must also lift the nuclear umbrella over South Korea; and fifth, the North Korean socialist system must be recognized.

Ho placed top priority on talks with the United States, saying that a meeting between government representatives "can solve all problems."

The United States had ignored North Korea's plea at Beijing contacts for a solution through negotiations, Ho told MAINICHI, warning that Pyongyang would take "firm action" if its plea was ignored.

As to what that firm action would be, the diplomat said only that it would surpass NPT withdrawal, and that if the U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions, North Korea would take even harsher measures.

On North Korea-Japan diplomatic normalization, Ho said Japan must acknowledge North Korea's sovereignty and apologize for the atrocities that it committed during 35 years of colonial rule over Korea.

There was no point in resuming the normalization talks as long as Japan was pressuring North Korea over the nuclear issue, Ho said.

Japanese Official, Premier Hwang Discuss NPT Withdrawal

OW2004052893 Tokyo KYODO in English 0500 GMT
20 Apr 93

[Text] Seoul, April 20 KYODO—Japan hopes for a peaceful resolution to North Korea's withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), a leading Japanese politician told South Korean Prime Minister Hwang In-song on Tuesday [20 April].

Seiroku Kajiyama, secretary general of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), made the remark in reply to Hwang, who had asked for Japan's cooperation in urging Pyongyang to retract its decision announced March 12 to withdraw from the NPT.

Kajiyama said Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa gives serious consideration to relations with China and Japan wants to see the North Korean nuclear issue resolved peacefully, officials said.

China has insisted that North Korea should not be driven into a corner with the threat of United Nations sanctions over its withdrawal decision or over inspections of two suspected nuclear facilities.

Beijing maintains that North Korea can be swayed through negotiations.

Turning to economic matters, the officials said, Kajiyama told Hwang there is a feeling that the Japanese recession is bottoming out and should begin to get better through the summer and autumn.

"We want to anticipate that this will play a role in eliminating the trade problem" with South Korea, Kajiyama said.

Japan's trade surplus with South Korea totaled 6.19 billion dollars in 1992, down from a record 8.76 billion dollars in 1991.

IAEA's Blix Notes Pyongyang's 'Flexible Attitude'

SK1504032493 Seoul YONHAP in English 0306 GMT
15 Apr 93

[Text] Tokyo, April 15 (YONHAP)—Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Wednesday that the agency was directly negotiating with North Korea to solve the nuclear problem.

Blix, in Japan for an international conference on atomic energy, was quoted by the YOMIURI SHIMBUN newspaper as saying that North Korea had a more responsive attitude than in mid-March, when it announced that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

He said it was a common recognition that Pyongyang has begun demonstrating a flexible attitude again.

Blix stressed that the agency was not just insisting on special inspections on North Korea's two nuclear facilities, but it wanted North Korea to allow inspectors to collect samples of nuclear waste.

The IAEA didn't stick to the name of the inspection, he added.

His remarks signal that the issue, now with the United Nations security council, might be resolved in direct negotiations between North Korea and the IAEA.

As an example of IAEA efforts in the matter, blix said it had suggested to the North in late March, before the board of governors met, that it cover those parts of the facilities if they were really military installations.

The move, he explained, was aimed at helping North alleviate worries about security.

In particular, Blix said that he discussed the issue with Kim Kwang-sop, North Korean ambassador to Vienna, on April 8 and the diplomat was very responsive.

PRC Role in Settling DPRK Nuclear Dispute Viewed

PM1504101193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Vladimir Skosyrev: "Pyongyang Exposes 'Intrigues' of Moscow and Washington"]

[Text] Beijing—After Tokyo protested the burial of nuclear fuel waste from Russian submarines in the Sea of Japan, Pyongyang immediately joined the voices denouncing Moscow.

Accusing Russia of polluting the world environment, DPRK radio put this question to listeners: What right does Moscow have to criticize us for withdrawing from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty if it is secretly depositing nuclear waste into the sea?

In brief, the problem of the Russian nuclear submarines has become a trump card for Pyongyang in its campaign aimed against its former older brother and ally in the socialist camp. Actually, in attacking Moscow North Korea still does not spare Washington. The DPRK Foreign Ministry has published a statement claiming that it was the United States, through nuclear blackmail and pressure on the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], which compelled Pyongyang to withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty. Therefore the UN Security Council should examine the conduct of Washington, not Pyongyang.

To judge by the bellicose tone of North Korea's propaganda tirades, it does not intend to make any concessions. But the East Asian states are not ceasing their efforts in the hope of settling the dispute by quiet diplomacy methods. In this connection observers were greatly interested by the report that next week the foreign ministers of China and South Korea will hold talks in Bangkok during a UN commission session.

This will be the first meeting of the heads of the two countries' diplomatic departments since North Korea announced its withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty. The South Korean ambassador to China said that the main subject of the talks will be the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. In the ambassador's opinion China is the only country which can give the DPRK "friendly advice" to return to the ranks of signatories of the treaty and make its peace with the IAEA.

North Korea depends on supplies of oil, coal, and food from China. In addition Beijing has won the North Korean rulers' gratitude for opposing the UN Security Council's application of sanctions against Pyongyang. So that it cannot be ruled out that China may ultimately assume the role of mediator in settling the conflict over the North Korean nuclear program.

Sale of SSM's to Iran Planned

PM1304101593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "DPRK Intends To Supply Iran With Intermediate-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Beijing—The economic crisis which has gripped North Korea is not preventing it from boosting the production of new categories of arms. The DPRK is now close to concluding tests of a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1,000 km, foreign diplomats in Beijing claim.

According to their data, Pyongyang could begin the series production of these missiles, technically superior to the Soviet "Scud" missiles, already by year's end. Thanks to this, President Kim Il-song and his son, who personify supreme power in the republic, will gain additional trumps in bargaining with the United States, which is worried by the North Korean nuclear program.

Customers willing to acquire the missiles have already been found. Pyongyang was recently visited by a high-ranking Iranian military delegation. It is believed that Tehran will more than likely be the first purchaser of this North Korean product.

The prospect of missile proliferation across Asia has prompted the United States, as well as Japan which lies well within their range, to take certain diplomatic steps. According to a Department of State spokesman, Washington has notified Pyongyang of its concern.

Judging by statements made by Secretary of State W. Christopher, the United States still advocates that the UN Security Council should deal with the North Korean nuclear program. Christopher has not ruled out the possibility of applying sanctions against the DPRK if it does not give up its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

To put it briefly, by pursuing its militant policy, the DPRK is running the risk of becoming, like Iraq and Libya, one of the international community's "pariahs." True enough, China is actively opposing Pyongyang's isolation. Speaking at a 6 April press conference, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jiangming declared that pressure and sanctions could only complicate matters.

The puzzle, however, is whether Beijing is prepared to take on a direct clash with the United States at the Security Council for the sake of its former socialist camp ally.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul Will Not Resume Dialogue Until Nuclear Issue Resolved

SK2004082593 Seoul YONHAP in English 0459 GMT 20 Apr 93

[Text] Seoul, April 20 (YONHAP)—South Korea said Tuesday it would not resume dialogue and economic cooperation with North Korea before the nuclear stalemate is broken.

The first priority was an international approach to the North Korean nuclear issue and Washington could negotiate directly with Pyongyang to get it to cooperate in resolving the nuclear problem, a government spokesman said.

The decisions came in an inter-ministerial meeting to discuss unification of Korea timed with completion of a pullout of troops and equipment that took part in the South Korea-U.S. military drill "Team Spirit" and the end of North Korea's political events.

Conditions are now ripe for Pyongyang to take the initiative in solving its nuclear problem and officials say they expect North Korea to soon show a change of attitude.

The meeting affirmed that the nuclear problem must be solved by peaceful means, that North Korea must return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that Pyongyang must accept special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and inter-Korean simultaneous inspections.

"Seoul will support international action such as by the U.N. Security Council and strengthen cooperation with the allies," vice unification minister Song Yong-tae said after the meeting said.

"We will actively seek persuasion of North Korea by related countries," he said, apparently referring to Chinese influence.

The meeting expressed support for an imminent North Korea-U.S. high-level contact, saying it could encourage North Korea to change its mind about NPT withdrawal and IAEA inspections.

North Korea announced last month it was leaving the NPT, the first country ever to do so. Its withdrawal becomes official on June 12.

The United States, in a change of mind, has strongly indicated that there will soon be direct high-level negotiations with North Korea.

Seoul, on the other hand, has decided that inter-Korean dialogue, at a standstill since September last year, is unlikely to make any meaningful progress without easing of tension over the nuclear issue.

"We cannot rule out the possibility that North Korea will propose to restart dialogue for the purpose of weakening international pressure," vice minister Song said.

"But we agreed to be prudent on the matter in order not to shadow the internationally coordinated action, and to harmonize with the U.N. Security Council's persuasion of North Korea and Washington-Pyongyang dialogue."

It was also decided not to expect any progress in inter-Korean relations, including economic cooperation, under the current circumstances.

"We, therefore, withhold economic cooperation ventures and businessmen's visits to North Korea," the statement said.

"But we will continue to allow ongoing trade of materials and business consultation contacts at third countries."

VIETNAM

Foreign Minister on DPRK's Nuclear Policy

AU2004141893 Munich FOCUS in German 19 Apr 93
p 155

[Interview with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam by Gaby Neujahr; place and date not given: "Settlers Against Saboteurs"]

[Text] [Neujahr] North Korea canceled its membership of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Do you feel threatened?

[Cam] We want the existing agreement on a nuclear-free zone between North and South Korea to be implemented. In any case, however, the question must be settled among the parties concerned in the region. Here the right to self-determination of the affected countries must be taken into account.

[Neujahr] Does that mean that the IAEA in Vienna and the United Nations should keep out?

[Cam] All involved in this conflict must show patience. A settlement or a compromise that pleases all involved parties must be found.

Moreover, those involved in the conflict must learn to listen better to their respective counterparts.

[Neujahr] That is to say, you do not feel threatened by North Korea's deviation and do not see a threat to Asia's security?

[Cam] I am convinced that a willingness to settle all controversies peacefully will gain the upper hand. All in this region are striving for peace and stability.

[Neujahr] At least this statement does not apply to your neighbor, Cambodia. How do you assess the chances of the UN peace plan?

[Cam] There is no doubt that the Khmer Rouge are sabotaging the Paris Agreement. Again and again, they kill UN soldiers and Vietnamese farmers living in Cambodia.

The nations of the world must condemn these murders by the Khmer Rouge, these bloody deeds. We are trying to prevent the sabotage acts of the Khmer Rouge with the help of the Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia.

[Neujahr] What do you expect in the way of cooperation with Germany after Foreign Minister Kinkel's visit?

[Cam] Particularly in the field of economy we want to clearly intensify cooperation with Germany. Germany is a highly developed country, which is far from having exhausted its potential in Asia. The Germans should not concentrate only on Europe. They should widen their horizon to Asia and the Pacific region.

[Neujahr] Amnesty International is accusing your country of human rights violations. What does your government want to do?

[Cam] The humanitarian policy of forgiveness is a long-standing tradition for us. The citizens' rights are accepted. There are no human rights violations.

However, people who call for the violation of our constitution are punished. Basically, however, only people who break laws are convicted in Vietnam.

[Neujahr] Klaus Kinkel gave you a list from Amnesty International. What will be done with it?

[Cam] We will examine the list with benevolence and goodwill. Moreover, we permitted the human rights commissioner of your government to convince himself of the situation on the spot.

CHILE

General Pinochet Visits PRC

HK2204141093 Hong Kong AFP in English 1349 GMT
22 April 93

[Text] Beijing, April 22 (AFP)—Chile's former dictator Augusto Pinochet began a highly discreet visit to China aimed at building bilateral military cooperation, a diplomatic source said.

The source said General Pinochet, former president of Chile, had arrived in Beijing before dawn on Thursday.

Pinochet, now commander in chief of the South American country's ground forces, is to meet with his Chinese counterpart Zhang Wannian and defense ministry officials.

He is also slated to visit Chinese military installations.

Pinochet, in a visit which officials have attempted to shroud in utmost secrecy, is also to go to Xian in central China, where major military industries are located, the source said.

Over the past few years, Chile's development of its defense industry has been relatively dynamic, particularly in the sectors of light weapons and tanks.

Pinochet is seeking to create various foreign partnerships in the production of arms and military equipment.

Chinese and Chilean officials have declined to officially confirm Pinochet's trip, believed to be ending on Sunday or Monday.

He was initially to have visited China in July 1989.

However, it was cancelled owing to Beijing's crackdown on democracy activists in June of that year and had been reportedly rescheduled several times since.

CUBA

Negotiation Favored on DPRK Nuclear Issue

SK1704050293 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0425 GMT
17 Apr 93

[Text] Pyongyang, April 17 (KCNA)—"The Cuban Government has consistently maintained that the grave situation created on the Korean peninsula must be settled through negotiation, not by strength", said Minister of Culture of Cuba Armando Hart Davalos.

The visiting minister told KCNA that Cuba's stand toward the demand of the International Atomic Energy Agency for a "special inspection" of the DPRK had been clearly manifested in a statement of the Foreign Ministry of Cuba.

"We will make joint efforts and cooperate with each other for the solution of the problem of 'special inspection' of Korea through negotiation", he stated.

INDIA

Commentary Views U.S. Sanctions, MTCR

BK1804141393 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 18 Apr 93

[Commentary by Dev Prakash]

[Text] After putting pressure on Russia not to supply cryogenic engine technology to ISRO [Indian Space Research Organization], [the] U.S. put sanctions against Indian Space Research Organization. This was against India's protest that cryogenic engine technology cannot be used for producing missile program. The American Administration even set aside the recommendation of the U.S. Carnegie Endowment Study group, the American think tank's report entitled: India and America after the cold war. It had advocated that while the U.S. should continue to deny licenses for the sale of U.S. technology that would directly contribute to the Indian missile program, it should not adopt a punitive approach toward the Indian missile and space programs as exemplified by the unsuccessful U.S. attempt to block in May 1992 the Russian sale of cryogenic rocket engines to New Delhi on the grounds that the engines could allegedly be used in the Agni [missile] program. In fact, the U.S. foreign policy considerations vis-a-vis the proliferators override its proliferation concerns. The cases of China, South Africa, Israel, and Pakistan prove the point.

The missile technology-related U.S. sanctions are based on the guidelines of the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] of 1987. The sanctions are imposed not only on the primary exporter but also on consignee or any user involved. The regime seeks to prevent the export of these to countries that are not members of the MTCR. Under these sanctions, licenses for export of control items are denied for a period of two years, no U.S. Government contracts are entered into for two years, and no products produced by the entities involved are imported into the U.S. for two years. The sanctions against ISRO and Russian Space Agency were imposed on 6 May 1992.

Similar MTCR-related sanctions are imports against North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan, China, and South Africa. Sanctions against China and South Africa were lifted during 1992 even when China brazenly continues to transfer its M-11 and M-9 technologies to Pakistan. And in NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], whereas North Korea continues to have U.S. sanctions slapped on it for alleged transfer of missiles. Sanctions were imposed against North Korea twice over within a span of four months—first, for transferring missile technology to Iran on 6 March 92 and later for transferring technology to Syria from 23 June 1992 for a period of two years. In contrast, the case of China is most revealing. Not only the initial sanctions were against specific Chinese entities only on 25 June 1991, but the sanctions were also completely waived within eight months of imposition in February 1992, on the recommendations of the then U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, on the ground that waiving of sanctions were essential to the national security of the U.S.

The U.S. knows well that Pakistan with Chinese assistance is developing four ballistic missiles with a maximum range up to 600 km. Even Brazil developed SS-300 missiles with

Chinese M-11 project. Pakistan's MATF-3 [name as heard] intermediate range missile program with a range of 300 km and a 500 kg warhead is based on Chinese technology. Similarly, China aided MATF-3 with a range of 600 km with the same warhead payload. Again, China and France have made significant progress in manufacturing intercontinental ballistic missile systems. Chinese have developed two large three-stage solid propellant ground launch and mobile systems known as DS-31 and DS-41 and the second generation SLBM known as SL-2. The irony here is that USA is fully aware that China has exported M-11 and M-9 missile technology to Pakistan in December 92. The sale has not attracted any fresh sanctions from the USA. In fact, the USA has not even commented on it. It remains to be seen whether sanctions against Pakistan are extended beyond June 93 when a two year period expires. Even in the face of top Congressional objections, the U.S. continues to accord Most Favored Nation status to China. Similarly, in the case of South Korea and Africa, the U.S. notification dated 15 October 1991 does not even mention that South Africa was engaged in missile proliferation activity. Israel had openly transferred (Jerryhod) 2-B missile technology to South Africa. But Israel has never been mentioned let alone attracting sanctions.

Party Leader Says Country Will Go Nuclear

BK2004155993 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 17 Apr 93 p 12

[By Tarun Basu]

[Excerpts] NEW DELHI, April 16—India will go nuclear when a Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, government comes to power, its leader Lal Krishna Advani has reiterated.

"I think that we have no option in this regard. Pakistan having become nuclear, China having been nuclear for many years now. India, simply in order to have its dealings with these two neighbours on a level ground, must be nuclear," Mr. Advani told India Abroad News Service in an extensive interview.

Mr. Advani said in principle his party was in favour of the world becoming non-nuclear as "we don't see any merit and virtue in nuclear armaments dominating the world scene." But with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT, as it is being discriminatory against non-nuclear powers and in a hostile neighbourhood "India must go nuclear."

He said India should think in terms of basic changes in the NPT when it comes up for review in 1995 or "think in terms of signing the (present) NPT after becoming nuclear."

Mr. Advani's interview was the first after his party's national executive met at Calcutta where it gave a new orientation to its policies to prepare for general elections which it feels are not far away. Unwittingly, Mr. Advani spoke of "my government" while answering a question on the BJP's future policies. He did not deny that he could be the BJP's prime ministerial candidate by being the party's next president, but said he was against holding twin posts of parliamentary leader in that case. [passage omitted]

Mr. Advani said Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao should not have met Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Dhaka. "There was no point in talking to him and you ask him to hand back the Memons?" Mr Advani asked. "Is this the kind of appeal that is to be made by the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan?"

On Kashmir, which was dealt at length at the party's national executive meeting, Mr. Advani called the Government's policy "myopic" and "bankrupt" and said a political solution can only come about "when physically these militants are made to realise that militancy and terrorism will not pay."

He said only a tough policy that had worked in the northeast and now in Punjab would work in Kashmir as the militants must be made to realise that "you are dealing with the authority of the State whose authority has not crumbled yet."

Editorial Views 'Prithvi' as Important Asset

93P50063Z Madras DINAMANI in Tamil 9 Feb 93 p 6

[Editorial: "An Important Asset"]

[Text] The tenth successful test of the indigenously developed and manufactured surface-to-surface missile (SSM) "Prithvi," demonstrates yet again that the "Indigenous Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP)," is a superb accomplishment.

As a part of the impressive collection of missiles developed by the scientists of IGMDP, the Prithvi plays a vital role. The latest launch, a 250 km range and 500 kilo payload version, would prove to be an invaluable asset as a battlefield support to any commander during hostilities. Designed to destroy crucial command structures and disorient formations in times of conflict, it is a vital tactical weapon. Military strategists consider SSMs as central to current planning of operations. It is not enough that there have been ten successful test launches. Although, the scientists are satisfied, now the soldiers have to tell how they find the missile. The servicemen must give the ultimate signal that it works. If more testing is required, then they should be conducted.

A company named Bharat Earthmovers has manufactured the tractor-erector-launcher capable of handling the entire range of functions of this missile. Last Sunday's successful launch utilized one of these, bringing this indigenous company's name also to the forefront.

So far, these tests have taken place only under favorable climatic conditions. In battle there is no guarantee of good weather. It is essential now to put the missile through conditions that are other than meteorologically placid as well. This is necessary to fully test it, and to establish the efficacy of the guidance system.

Given resolve, India is capable of attaining self-sufficiency in missile technology, and it is evident in the vigor with which the IGMDP has been conducted. It is especially significant since India is faced with U.S. sanctions in the purchase of cryogenic rockets from Russia, per previously concluded bilateral agreements. These sanctions are based on a dubious interpretation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. India has never sought to acquire the

technology surreptitiously. Since Pakistan, with China's assistance, has already deployed missiles of this kind, the vital need for India to induct the Prithvi is obvious. After all, India has every right to make decisions on matters of her defense and security.

IRAN

Nuclear Capability, Israeli Allegations Viewed

NC1804134093 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English
10 Apr 93 p 4

[Column by Dr. Jalil Roshandel and Dr. Sa'ideh Lotfian: "Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation: Is Iran a Nuclear-Capable State?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] **Iran's Nuclear Program**

Recently, numerous reports have spoken of Iran's attachment to the nuclear weapon option. Fears of an Iranian bomb has risen again as a result of the intention of the government to complete the Bushehr reactor.

The Shah of Iran had an ambitious nuclear power program, and had declared that Iran must acquire nuclear capability. Triggered by the invasion of Kuwait and anti-Iranian attacks in the western press, it looked as if Iran was about to resume the Shah's ambitious nuclear plans by seeking outside assistance to complete the construction of the Bushehr reactor.

Bushehr reactor (lightwater/low enriched uranium, 1300 MWe) supplied by the Kraftwerk Union (West Germany), and was partially completed when the construction was suspended in 1979. This reactor had been damaged twice by Iraqi warplanes in November 1987 and July 1988. Since Iran is a member of the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] and has accepted comprehensive IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards, the IAEA has the authority to place the reactor under verification procedures once the plant is completed. The pre-revolutionary government of Iran had signed an agreement with Framatome (France) for a second power reactor (Darkhovin) in Ahvaz (light water/low-enriched uranium, 935 MWe). Its construction had just begun when the 1979 revolution toppled the monarchical regime. The country has a research reactor (light water/highly-enriched uranium, 5 MWt) in Tehran, which had been supplied by the U.S. in 1967.

Unlike many Third World states, it is argued that Iran does not need to invest in nuclear program as an alternative source of energy. Iran is one of the major oil-exporting states in the area. Even oil-producing nations need to invest in nuclear research. Oil will not last for ever. If Iran does not invest in the nuclear programs, it will fall too far behind the rest of the world. At present, Iran is not under great pressure to use non-oil energy sources, but plans to acquire the technological capability for taking advantage of electricity generating capacity of nuclear reactors.

Those who disagree that Iran, as an oil-producing nation, is in need of nuclear energy, neglect to consider power shortages and "the need for additional electric generating capacity for factories. Iran's objective is to have nuclear power plants for electricity and for desalination plant."

According to Martin [not further identified], "to create a fully self-sufficient nuclear industry requires considerable expense and technological capacity, and the good fortune to have access to raw materials." Iran is fortunate to be in possession of uranium reserves in Yazd province. In a recent official visit to the central province of Yazd the Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani "expressed pleasure at the discovery of uranium, adding that the three iron ore mines have a total of 800 million tons of proved reserves."

Iran has accepted the IAEA safeguards to be applied to all of its nuclear facilities. There is a belief that the Third World states, like Iran, could not be trusted to honor any agreement including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This argument is based on the idea of unverifiability of the compliance with the terms of any arms control treaties. That Iran has never held any objectives for nuclear non-proliferation is at the heart of recent attacks against Iran.

Deutch, in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* suggests that "willingness to sign the NPT is not a guarantee against proliferation". What is noteworthy is his assertion that Iran's signing of the NPT was "undoubtedly the price for receiving further nuclear assistance from (its) principal nuclear supplier", the United States. While, it is "possible that when Iraq and Libya signed, they had no nuclear ambitions."

The assertion (encouraged by Israel) that Iran is pursuing a military strategy based on acquiring nuclear capabilities for military use is officially and categorically rejected. Not surprisingly, the Israelis have been greatly concerned about the possibility of a second Middle Eastern country acquiring nuclear capability, and thus put an end to their regional nuclear monopoly. To protect their military superiority, the Israeli government has resorted to sabotage, assassinations, air strikes, and disinformation. "In April 1970 the naval yards at Seyne-sur Mer in France were attacked by commandos who destroyed metal casings about to be dispatched to the Iraqi French-built reactor."

"In June 1980 Professor Yahya al-Mashad, an Egyptian scientist working on the Franco-Iraqi nuclear program was found beaten to death in a Paris hotel room. As with the Seyne-sur Mer attack, the Israeli secret service Mosad, was suspected." When all these tactics failed to block the construction of the Osiris reactor, Israeli jet aircrafts destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. There are now allegations made by Israel, claiming Iran plans to acquire nuclear weapons to be used against the Jewish state. Given available evidence, Israel is a nation whose nuclear activities deserves to be carefully monitored. Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli nuclear technician, told the London *SUNDAY TIMES* in October 1986 that he had worked in a secret underground Israeli bomb factory for nine years. As a non-party to the NPT whose highly secret and unsafeguarded nuclear reactor poses a major threat to the security of other states in the region, Israel must become the focus of non-proliferation policy efforts.

There have even been report of the sale of nuclear warheads by Kazakhstan. Iran has "denied any intention to purchase or to build nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction." The Iranian view is that had Iranian nuclear policy been assessed for what it actually is, and

Iranian support of the NPT (and acceptance of the NPT verification terms) would have been sufficient to demonstrate that Iran is not seeking nuclear military capability.

A U.S. government report addresses the present capabilities for detecting nuclear explosions, and concludes that "seismology provides a means to monitor underground nuclear explosions down to low yields, even when strenuous attempts are made to evade the monitoring system." Therefore, seismology is an important technique for the "verification (or the process of confirming compliance and detecting violations if they occur)."

Other means to verify compliance with the NPT includes a global network of seismic monitoring stations, satellite photoreconnaissance, and onsite inspection. It is noted that "a violator would not be likely to permit inspection of areas in which clandestine tests had been held, whatever the consequences of his refusal... The conditions under which on-site inspections would be allowed to take place—that is, whether they would be voluntary or mandatory—are relevant." In another word, "the voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all of a country's nuclear facilities and activities is yet another way to generate the needed confidence."

At the invitation of Iranian government, a delegation of the IAEA experts visited Iran's nuclear research center in 1991.

Majles Ratifies Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation

LD1304165193 Tehran IRNA in English 1629 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] Tehran, April 13, IRNA—The Majles on Tuesday ratified bills of separate cooperation pacts linked with the People's Republic of China and the Federative Republic of Russia, on peaceful application of nuclear energy.

According to the agreements, Iran will cooperate with China in wide ranging fields such as basic and applicable research for peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, designing, building and operating of nuclear power plants, research on reactors, extraction and exploration of Uranium ore, radiation safeguards and ecological protection.

The 12-point agreement was signed for Iran by President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani during his visit to Beijing last September.

"The two sides should give guarantees not to put at the disposal of a third party without the written permission of the other party, the information exchanged or resulting from joint researches and developments," Article Four of the agreement read.

The 10-point Iran-Russia cooperation pact on peaceful utilization of nuclear energy was also inked for Iran by Rafsanjani during his visit to Moscow in July 1989.

"Nuclear materials and related equipment should neither be utilized for proliferation of nuclear weapons or any kind of explosive devices nor for any kind of military purposes", an article of the agreement said.

"Application of nuclear materials should be under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and undertake physical safeguards", according to another clause of the article.

A direct air link between Iran and was among the bills discussed and ratified in the open session of the Majles today.

Tehran's Nuclear Capabilities Viewed

NC1804144393 Tehran *TEHRAN TIMES* in English
11 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by Dr. Jalil Roshandel and Dr. Sa'ideh Lotfian: "Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation: Is Iran a Nuclear-Capable State?"]

[Excerpts] The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors "found no sign confirming allegations regarding Iran's nuclear programs". At a news conference in Vienna, in September 1992, the head of IAEA, Hans Blix mentioned Iran "as the first country that demonstrated openness vis-a-vis the IAEA by inviting an agency mission to visit any place in the country that it wanted to see." If Iran was about to declare a policy of pacifist neutralism, would the construction of the reactor be acceptable to the nuclear weapon states? [passage omitted]

Aside from the impossibility of testing a nuclear device clandestinely, it must be emphasized that without a missile program, the military and political value of the acquired or manufactured nuclear weapons for Iran would be nil. Does Iran possess a reasonably effective nuclear weapons delivery capability?

Third World states with ballistic missiles, with ranges of 40 km to 9600 km include: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, PRC, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Yemen. Iran has Scud-B (supplied by USSR, with a 300 km range), 'Oqab (produced indigenously, with a range of 40 km), and Iran-130 (jointly produced with PRC, with 130 km range). Most, if not all, countries own fighter aircrafts which can deliver a nuclear bomb.

However, given the need to emphasize the revitalization of civilian sectors of the economy after 8 years of war with Iraq, it is unlikely that Iran will be able to become a member of the Club. Iran has declared its intention to keep her nuclear facilities open to IAEA inspection safeguards. President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), Reza Amrollahi declared that "we believe in full-scope safeguards and we try to be very transparent as we should." Iran has also welcomed the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) as a political solution to control the nuclearization of the Middle East. [passage omitted]

PAKISTAN

Withdrawal of U.S. Defense Aid Decried

BK1504125693 Islamabad *THE NATION* in English
15 Apr 93 p 6

[Editorial: "Pakistan Nuclear Tangle"]

[Text] The report that Iran had offered to underwrite the entire defence budget of Pakistan in return for transfer of nuclear technology to that country may or may not be correct, but it does highlight the predicament in which the US has placed a former ally by reneging on all defence contracts with Pakistan. According to this report, a time may come when driven driven to the wall by the US, Pakistan which has resisted the Iranian offer so far may well be tempted to accept it. What makes such an eventuality plausible are three rather crucial factors. One is that after the stoppage of all aid to Pakistan and because of the heavy drain on its internal resources exercised by its defence expenditure, it is desperately short of cash. The instability in Afghanistan and the unwillingness of Afghan refugees to go home only aggravates Pakistan's cash shortage. The second factor is the helplessness of the West in general and the US in particular, to stop India from pursuing its already well-tested weapon-oriented nuclear programme. A conservative estimate by the West of the nuclear arsenal stockpiled by India is 25 to 30 bombs, and more are being made. As against that Pakistan's programme was frozen at its 1990 level to please the US. The dispute that has marred Pakistan-US relations is not about Pakistan's nuclear capability, which everyone knows can hardly be unlearned, but about Pakistan being asked to destroy whatever has already been built, leaving India the sole nuclear power in South Asia. The third factor is the continuation by default of the policies of the Bush administration. The Clinton administration has not had time to review them because it has other priorities on its agenda and secondly, because it has no one in the State Department to review them. In the meantime the international conference on Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which the US is vitally involved, is being held about three weeks from now. Completely unprepared as the new US administration is likely to be for this conference, it may choose to adopt the Bush policies—i.e. a free hand to India and isolation of Pakistan—which may in fact result in nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with or without the alleged Iran connection.

Whether or not the US Congress chooses to review the wisdom of the Pressler Amendment, in view of the latest reports about South Africa and Israel, besides of course Pakistan and India, having joined the nuclear club, the US administration will be left with little option but to take into account the present day realities of balance of power in regional conflicts. Driven to desperation Pakistan can be forced to resume its frozen nuclear programme. The visit of the COAS [Chief of Army Staff] to the US, now only four or five days away, could help untangle some of the short-sighted policies of the previous US administration. At least an attempt to balance them could be made. Otherwise more of the same may not turn out to be of advantage to the US.

RUSSIA

IAEA on Tomsk Nuclear Plant Plutonium After Explosion**Finds Only One-Third**

AU1904163893 Paris AFP in English 1259 GMT 19 Apr 93

[Text] Vienna, April 19 (AFP)—International inspectors have found less than a third of the plutonium that was inside a nuclear weapons plant in Siberia before an explosion there two weeks ago, officials said Monday.

"We have not been able to determine yet whether any of the plutonium was released," said David Kyd, a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"It is possible that the two thirds missing are somewhere inside the heavily damaged plant but we cannot exclude the possibility that some plutonium escaped," he added.

Of the 310 grams (11 ounces) at the plant before the April 6 blast, an IAEA team has located only 80 grams (three ounces), he said.

The three investigators, who visited the Tomsk site in Siberia between Thursday and Sunday of last week, gathered earth, snow and grass samples from the region. The items will be examined by IAEA labs near Vienna.

Kyd said any radioactivity from the blast should disappear within one to six months. The radioactive effect of the explosion amounted to 40 curie points, compared to the 1986 Chernobyl blast which recorded between 25 and 50 million curie points, he said.

He added that as a protective measure, about a hundred residents from a village neighboring the Tomsk plant have been evacuated for two months.

The blast occurred at a chemical storage facility on the Tomsk site.

Seeks Missing Plutonium

LD2004114493 Hamburg DPA in German 1108 GMT 20 Apr 93

[Text] Vienna (DPA)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is looking for 228 grams of highly toxic plutonium which has been missing since the explosion in the Tomsk-7 military reprocessing plant in Russia. IAEA spokesman David Kyd confirmed on Tuesday in response to an enquiry that before the accident there had been a total of 310 grams of the substance—which is necessary for the production of nuclear weapons—in the container which exploded. Only 82 grams had been recovered.

Three experts of the nuclear agency, who were allowed to visit a military nuclear plant in the former Soviet Union for the first time last week, have taken samples of grass, soil, water, and snow from around the western Siberian nuclear plant which will now be analyzed in the IAEA's own research center in Seibersdorf in Lower Austria, Kyd said. Results will probably be available by Wednesday next week. The tests should show whether plutonium was released in the nuclear accident on 6 April.

Kyd said that the cause of the accident was human failure: "Too much nitric acid was pumped into the tank, and then the lid was blown off."

Yeltsin on Elimination of Chemical Weapons

LD2004194693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1845 GMT 20 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The Russian president's press service has circulated a statement of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on elimination of chemical arms:

Public of several regions has been recently alarmed over the destruction of chemical arms.

Tens of thousands of tonnes of combat toxic agents were produced and stored in Russia over several decades. The world has changed, same as Russia's position in the world, we do not plan to attack anyone.

It is time to get rid of chemical arms - the past we have inherited. This is not only the opinion of Russia, it is also the common opinion of 138 states, which signed a convention to ban chemical arms this year in Paris.

We must start the elimination of chemical arms, proceeding from requirements of international and national safety; shells and tanks gradually become worthless and they cannot be stored forever. The arms were produced by several plants for many years.

The destruction will be complicated and it will take much time. But it must be started. A state program on elimination of chemical arms is being prepared. The program will be based on the following principles:

1. Unconditional provision of safety of the population's life and health and the environment;
2. Unconditional fulfillment of all requirements on social protection of the population, residing in the zone of influence of enterprises to destruct chemical arms;
3. The use of advanced technologies to minimize the risk and receive in the destruction, when it is possible, precious chemical substances;
4. Minimum toxic agents' transportation on Russian territory.

The destruction of chemical arms will start only after a positive conclusion of the state ecological examination on the whole program and each specific facility. The examination will involve scientists, specialists, representatives or public, including ecological, organizations, both regional and all-Russian.

I call on the executive power bodies of Udmurtiya, Chuvashiya and the Saratov region to actively join the elaboration of the program, establish the priorities and conditions of preparations for the destruction of chemical arms. This participation will help to turn this step, inevitable for Russia, into a powerful lever of social-economic development of many Russian regions and strict observation of guarantees of the population's safety.

A considerable part of money to be allocated on the program will be used for regional health care, mother and

child care, housing construction, building of cultural facilities, highways and other engineering infrastructure.

Piles of useless and dangerous chemical arms is a heavy burden of the past. Russia must get rid of it in the interests of its own safety, in the interests of safety of the whole world.

Moscow Parries Charges of Obstructiveness Over Nukes

PM2004152593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 93 First Edition p 3

[Gennadiy Charodeyev report: "Moscow Fails To Receive Kiev's Response to Nuclear Disarmament Proposals"]

[Text] At a Kiev press conference devoted to the results of the visit by General H. von Ondarza, commander in chief NATO Forces Europe Center, Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, Ukrainian deputy defense minister, claimed that "Russia is artificially creating difficulties over the nuclear and environmental safety of strategic nuclear forces sited on Ukrainian territory."

How far does this statement square with reality? Our question was answered by special envoy Yuriy Dubinin, leader of the Russian state delegation for talks with Ukraine.

"Recently," he noted, "we have often been hearing similar glib statements from Ukrainian representatives, unfortunately. I can state with complete authority that our efforts are aimed at opening up the most favorable prospects for ratification of the START I Treaty by Ukraine and Ukraine's speediest accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty. We are acting in response to the response from Ukraine itself to be given security guarantees, but these guarantees will come into force only after Ukraine accedes to the treaty as a nonnuclear state."

The diplomat noted that it is being proposed that Ukraine remove on a very tight schedule the front sections of missiles located on its territory and send all the nuclear munitions to Russia for destruction—under the control of Ukraine itself. Yu. Dubinin stressed that Russia, apart from political guarantees, proposes that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on Ukrainian territory could be denuclearized [snyat poletnyye zadaniya] before 1 August 1993 in order to fully rule out the possible use of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory.

"Russia is not abandoning its position of continuing to resolve the question, of interest to the Ukrainian side, of recycling nuclear warheads in such a way as to ensure that the nuclear materials released can be used as fuel for Ukrainian AES' [nuclear electric power stations]," the ambassador said. The Russian delegation submitted its technical and financial calculations to the Ukrainians as quickly as possible—it handed over a draft agreement back in early March. We have not received [my tak i ne dozhdalis] a response to a single proposal.

"We are prepared to coordinate with Ukraine a system of material and technical supply, and of supervision of the operation of missile complexes in line with guarantees and manufacturers' warranties [systema...garatiynogo i avtorskogo nadzora]. The draft of the corresponding agreement has been fully finalized and is ready for signing at the level

of the two countries' government leaders. But Ukraine has called the already agreed text into question."

Yu. Dubinin stated that Russia is doing everything incumbent on it to reach agreement with Ukraine on all aspects of nuclear disarmament. "Admittedly, talks have been under way for a year now, and there have been no practical results.

"Moscow," Yu. Dubinin continued, "is convinced that nuclear weapons cannot be owned by a nonnuclear state. Safety will be ensured only through a system of consistently interlinked components subject to unified command and control. All the legal and political prerequisites are currently in place for the sides to achieve this."

START II Drawing Moscow Into 'Re-Arming Race'

OW1604192493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 16 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a press conference on Friday [16 April] in Moscow Deputy of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Coordinator of Faction Fatherland, General Lieutenant Gennadiy Benov declared that the START-2 Treaty "is drawing" Russia not into reduction of armed forces but into a "nuclear re-arming race." He indicated that it would be better for Russia to unilaterally disarm "according to those rates and directions which correspond to its interests" than to sign the START-2 Treaty.

In accordance with this document, Benov asserts, Russia will be forced to change the structure of its strategic offensive forces, making it analogous to the Americans. Ground based ICBMs, including silo-based ICBMs, constitute 20% of the American and 60% of the Russian strategic offensive forces. "Russia will be forced to cut down this component of the nuclear triad by 40%," Benov noted.

At the same time, he said, Moscow will be forced to rapidly increase the "sea" (from 30% to 50%) and "air" (from 10% to 30%) components of the triad; these efforts demand multi-billion spending and would not promote an increase in the country's defensive potential. For their part, the Americans have nothing to change.

Benov predicts that in such a form as it was signed this January 3, the START-2 Treaty cannot be ratified and will not be ratified by the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Russian Decree on Missile Export Controls

93P50107A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 17 Mar 93 p 3

["Decree of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation, 27 January 1993, No 70, Moscow"]

[Text] In accordance with directive No. 20 of the president of the Russian Federation of 11 January "On the Introduction of Control Over Exporting From the Russian Federation Equipment, Materials, and Technologies Used in Creating Missile Weapons," the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. The accompanying statute on the procedure for control over exporting from the Russian Federation equipment, materials, and technologies used in creating missile weapons is confirmed.

2. The Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation attached to the Government of the Russian Federation, jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation, will provide for the organization of control over exporting from the Russian Federation equipment, materials, and technologies used in creating missile weapons.

V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation

Yeltsin Decree on Constructing Nuclear Power Plants Abroad

LD2104165993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Apr 93

[Text] President Yeltsin today signed a decree on the fulfillment by the Russian Federation of inter-government agreements on cooperation in constructing nuclear power stations abroad. According to the document, the relevant departments have been instructed to submit within two months to the Russian Cabinet of Ministers drafts of joint agreements in this sphere with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania, which must include the sides' obligations on handling spent nuclear fuel. The decree establishes that 25 percent of the hard currency funds received for processing spent nuclear fuel are channelled into implementing programs for radiation control, ecological improvement and the economic development of the regions where processing enterprises are situated.

Reaction Statement on Ukraine's Nuclear Ambitions

PM1304090993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 9 Apr 93 p 2

[Igor Sukhanov report: "Is Ukraine Threatened With Another Chernobyl? That Danger Has Arisen Because the Country's Leaders Are Refusing To Carry Out Their Nuclear Weapons Pledges"]

[Text] The Russian Government has issued a statement on the nuclear weapons sited on Ukrainian territory. The document has appeared for many reasons.

As you know, L. Kravchuk's signature on the decision adopted by the CIS heads of state on nuclear weapons nonproliferation defines Ukraine's status as a state without nuclear weapons. However, a Ukrainian presidential edict of 5 April 1992 (No. 209) followed by Order No. 09 [as published] issued by the Ukrainian defense minister 23 April 92 included the 43d Missile and 46th Air Armies and their combat units—176 missile launch systems and 43 strategic bombers—in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In May 1992 the personnel of two nuclear-technical units in the 46th Air Army, where roughly 670 strategic nuclear warheads [boyezaryady] are sited, took the Ukrainian oath. The flight personnel of all the strategic bombers also took the Ukrainian oath. There is constant pressure on

servicemen in the 43d Missile Army to take the Ukrainian oath. Ukraine has thus obtained the potential to use nuclear weapons.

In January 1993 a new subunit was formed within the Ukrainian Armed Forces structure—the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Center for Administrative Control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

All these and other elements undoubtedly indicate one thing: Ukraine clearly aspires to the status of a nuclear power.

That is why Kiev refused when Russia asked to take the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory under its jurisdiction. The same fate befell a compromise proposed by Moscow whereby nuclear warhead assemblies would be detached from ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles within a very short period—roughly 18 months—and moved to Russian territory for destruction under Ukrainian supervision, and targeting information would be removed over the following few months from all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in order to completely preclude the use of nuclear weapons.

Instead it became obvious during the second round of Russian-Ukrainian talks at the beginning of March 1993 that Ukraine has no intention of completely eliminating the strategic arms on its territory within seven years as envisaged by the START I Treaty. Kiev is trying to force Russia to recognize that the nuclear weapons belong to Ukraine and, what is more, is striving to ensure that Russia takes responsibility for ensuring the safekeeping of those weapons.

At a press conference in connection with the Russian Federation Government Statement Russian Deputy Defense Minister B. Gromov stressed: "Nuclear weapons cannot have two owners and nuclear safety cannot be ensured by two entities. Russia is not failing to supply Ukraine with replacement subassemblies for the nuclear weapons in order to put pressure on Ukraine. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry promptly replaces all sets of assemblies on nuclear munitions under Russian statehood alone."

Direct Export of Military Weaponry Urged

OW1504202093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1924 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian military industry does not enjoy a single contract on export of arms in 1993, while it is ready to supply \$20 Bn. [billion] worth of various weaponry. State orders on production of weapons are down by 50%, on development of new types of weapons by 40%, while the share of materiel in the total output of the military industrial complex in the first quarter of this year is a mere 19%, only half of last year's. This data was provided by the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Committee for Defense Industries Gennadiy Yampolskiy at an extended board of the Committee on Thursday [15 April].

Yampolskiy claimed the state order for arms export equaled \$480 Mn. [million] this year, which basically signified "the state's refusal to offer credits for the exportation of weaponry." As a result the enterprises of the military industrial complex lost some 600,000 specialists and another 14% of the complex's employees are expected to leave in the first quarter of this year.

The deputy chairman regards instability in Russia one of the main reasons for the failure of Russia's military industry on the world market. As a result of it the potential customers are wary of signing long-term contracts. The other cause is that researchers and manufacturers of weapons are "kept aside and lack interest" in arms trade.

A transition to direct export of military produce and services by its manufacturers ought to be initiated to alter the situation, stressed Yampolskiy.

Should the situation stay the same for another 3 to 5 years, Russia will lose its defense potential, thinks the Deputy Chairman.

TV Feature on Biological Weapons Center

LD1604030693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1455 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the magazine program "Cherta s Dva" with host Mikhail Leshchinskiy]

[Text] [Leshchinskiy] This is the 1 February issue of NEWSWEEK magazine. The top headline is: Inside the Soviet Biological Center. It starts like a detective novel: Two British intelligence experts stepped into total darkness. One of them turned on a lantern to illuminate the walls and the equipment, but the official Foreign Ministry representative who accompanied him grabbed his wrist and said: Either switch it off or give it to me. Those few seconds of illumination, however, were sufficient to understand that the intelligence men were in what biologists call a test chamber, a 15-meter steel cube in which test animals are subjected to a fine spray from vents in the ceiling. This could be drops of what is known as a lethal mist.

This was written by a British journalist, but our film crew managed to cover this path right to the end and to illuminate all the details of the secret biological weapons.

[Voiceover by unidentified female] When I learned these facts, I began to be plagued by nightmares: Someone was hammering into my brain long forgotten words—anthrax, botulism, cholera, plague. I dreamed everything imaginable. Why are we human beings so vengeful and suspicious?

[G.A. Sofronov, chief toxicologist of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, identified by caption] On the whole, it seems to me that this is some feature of the human mind, but this is a very complicated problem. I do not know; it seems to me if the devil incarnate exists. Then, it probably is the refined human mind which creates weapons and killing tools which are similar to itself. I am unable to find an explanation for this in purely human terms. This is no longer theater of the absurd; this is simply life in the absurd. [video shows Sofronov interviewed in room; camera switches to blackboard with formula written on it; exterior of building, institute's name plate which says

All-Union Research Institute for Especially Pure Biopreparations, interior views of laboratory and equipment are shown]

[Unidentified male correspondent] Here is this very institute in the historic center of St. Petersburg which has been featured in the magazine article and a BBC report and which has been visited by international commissions, one after the other, and by us, the first Russian television journalists.

Perhaps it was precisely in this laboratory that the refined human mind which Genrikh Aleksandrovich Sofronov spoke about prepared the magic poison which in scientific language is called biological offensive strains of microorganisms.

Today the laboratories of our once flourishing scientific institutions are an exact copy of the country—in total collapse. Applied science senselessly queues up for the state budget. As no one has given anything yet, let us talk about the institute's glorious past. [Correspondent turns to S.S. Avtushenko, head of the laboratory, identified by caption] Sergey Sergeyevich, all the same there were military orders and evidently there was something to make fuss about. Please tell us the truth.

[Avtushenko] Undoubtedly, there were military orders, but there was nothing to make a fuss about. Why? Well, because we were engaged only in developing vaccines to protect the population.

[Correspondent] From what?

[Avtushenko] Special preventive preparations to protect people from particularly dangerous infections. We were engaged, in particular, in developing vaccines to protect people from plague.

[Correspondent] But there is no smoke without fire.

[Avtushenko] Of course, there is no smoke without fire. That is correct, but we only had vaccine smoke and there was no fire at all.

[video shows work under way in laboratories] [Correspondent] I have been interested in this subject for a long time. The St. Petersburg Institute is not my first. I think that the lack of trust in our scientists is caused in the first place by the fact that until recently we stubbornly concealed the fact that some programs on biological weapons continued in our country until almost 1992 just as they did in other countries. Second is our present constant understatement, the ideological fear not to let too much slip out. This has been firmly drummed into us. With the indifference of the condemned, no one tries to prove the opposite, so we remain with the stigma of being guilty.

[V.P. Tokarev, scientific worker, identified by caption] I think that you should start off from engineering communications. One can always tell the possibilities of the work from what comes out. Just take a look. If there are no separating systems and nothing special is needed to take things away, then that means that there are no such things here.

[Correspondent] So why is there all this fuss?

[Tokarev] You know, I would connect it with the person who remained in the West. He needed to be able to present something interesting.

[Unidentified female correspondent] To whom was he referring? Vladimir Artemovich Pasechnik, the former director of this very same Institute. A brilliant career. For 37 years he headed the Institute which he also established. In 1989 he remained abroad. He has been living and working in Britain. It is precisely his sensational pseudo-exposures which have branded staff members of the Institute as scientific scoundrels. [Video shows photograph of Pasechnik on form headed "Replies," giving date of birth, nationality, family origin, date when he joined the CPSU, party card number, studies and scientific work; video shows a written autobiography, two more photographs of Pasechnik, and sheet with names entitled "Composition of the U.S.-Great Britain delegation"]

[Y.N. Sventitskiy, director of the Institute, identified by caption] A NEWSWEEK article appears which not only explained, so to speak, everything that ruled out any possibility of our being guilty of this accusation which we find unpleasant, but also mentioned the commission's conclusions. However, it was said that we had not only been producing but are still producing a plague so virulent as to be resistant to all antibiotics currently known in the West. That is to say, this is a quite patent hysteria which arouses, generally speaking, not only distress but even indignation. The facts have been distorted, I fear deliberately.

[Female correspondent] The fear of a manmade end of the world is mankind's abiding nightmare. Yet, all we have to do is to obey Our Lord's commandment "Thou shalt not kill."

LITHUANIA

Police Hunt Uranium Stolen From Ignalina

PM1304101693 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 13 Apr 93 p 13

[Report by Matthias Lifkens in Vilnius: "Safety Fear in Lithuania as Uranium Disappears"]

[Text] Hundreds of pounds of nuclear materials have disappeared in Lithuania, which has become the major transit point for smuggling radioactive substances from Russia to the West.

More than 600 pounds of uranium and strontium recently disappeared from a nuclear power plant in Ignalina, north-east Lithuania, and police are looking for 22 pounds of uranium 238 stolen from the industrial town of Panevezys.

Both incidents raised concern over the safety of the nuclear power industry in the former Soviet Union, highlighted by an explosion last week at Tomsk 7, when plutonium was spread through a small area of forest, and by the revelation that at least 20 nuclear reactors were dumped at sea off the Russian Arctic and Pacific shores.

The spectre of theft is haunting authorities at the nuclear power plant in Ignalina, who discovered the theft of the container of nuclear fuel during an annual inventory in January.

"The container which is listed in the inventory must be somewhere in the plant," said an official, who blamed the theft on problems of accounting. The director of the plant said it was virtually "impossible to steal the 21-foot long container".

For the past month Lithuanian investigators have also been unable to locate two rods of uranium which were allegedly thrown into a river near Panevezys. The uranium is said not to be enriched and cannot be used in weapons production.

After being tipped off by the Russian prosecutor, Lithuanian police arrested Raimondas Urbonas, a metal dealer, who admitted smuggling 22 pounds of slightly radioactive uranium from Russia to Lithuania to be sold in Poland.

Prosecutors believe Urbonas lied, and that the uranium is either in the hands of the local "mafia" or has already been sold to the West.

Urbonas told investigators he had brought the uranium for several hundred thousand Deutschmarks in a cafe in Glazov, a city in the Urals, then transported it in his suitcase by train to Lithuania.

On hearing that the gang which stole the uranium from a plant in Russia had been arrested, he claimed to have thrown the remaining rods into a river.

The search for the radioactive metal has so far not yielded any results. According to investigators, it is extremely difficult to locate the uranium, which could have sunk into the mud of the river bed.

"At least it is better kept in this river than in the hands of a country which tries to produce the atomic bomb," a local newspaper quoted a member of the search squad as saying.

The inexperienced police force admits its inability to hunt for radioactive material. The risk of being caught with uranium is very low," admitted one investigator.

After protests from Germany, the Lithuanian borders were recently equipped with radioactive detectors, although, according to the chief of the Lithuanian border guards, the Soviet-made dosimeters are "useless to detect small amounts of uranium".

UKRAINE

Alleged Palestinian Warhead Purchase Termed 'Red Herring'

PM0604104793 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Apr 93 p 5

[D. Kulik report: "Nuclear Bazaar Continues"]

[Text] A sensation has broken in the AL-QUDS newspaper. An article published in it states that "Palestinian resistance movement fighters have acquired two nuclear warheads from Ukraine for \$30 million." It also claims that a "group of specialists made up of five former officers from nuclear-technical units who had previously served with the USSR Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate

in Ukraine, has arrived in southern Lebanon, where they have embarked on training Palestinian fighters to use nuclear munitions."

Even at first reading this article seemed dubious. Yet let's look into it—just who needs such articles and why? The PLO? Hardly. Its spokesmen officially denied the reports about warhead purchases. And even without this statement it was clear that the PLO would not do such a thing, so as to preserve the albeit protracted negotiating process and not whip up tension. They hardly want to give the Israelis an excuse to launch an anti-Palestinian campaign. Incidentally, about Israel... It is keeping quiet about this "deal." If it had actually happened, the Israeli press would long since have informed the whole world about it.

Also confusing is the "place where the warheads were obtained"—Morocco. But it transpires that the Moroccans know nothing about it—nor do the Cypriots, via whom it is planned to ship the "goods" to Lebanon. The Lebanese are perplexed about the AL-QUDS report. Nor is it understood how the warheads are to be shipped. Like oranges, with just the necessary documentation, and openly, having announced the route? Even nonspecialists would smile bitterly to hear of such plans. Nor is it clear how a possible nuclear strike against Israel would be delivered. By multiple rocket launcher? That is unlikely. Shipments of rocket launchers are controlled both by international observers and by Lebanon itself.

We could discuss the authenticity of the AL-QUDS report for a long time and ask all sorts of questions. But it is already sufficiently clear from the above that it is just a "red herring." But it may be willingly seized upon by radicals among both the Palestinians and the Israelis. It is not hard to imagine how the latter, were they to get their hands on the article on the sale of the warheads, would pressure their government and demand that it harden its stance. The result would be clear—repression in the occupied territories and the breakdown of the Arab-Israeli talks.

Incidentally, hard-liners on both sides sometimes operate very harmoniously without even suspecting it themselves. In late September last year journalists obtained information to the effect that a "certain Palestinian fundamentalist organization had sent a telegram (!) to the appropriate Russian authorities asking to buy warheads." The very fact that a telegram was sent by mail in itself shows how "serious" the report was. Checks confirmed that this was another "red herring." But the deed had been done, and some of what was said has probably stuck in readers' minds....

Further Reporting on Nuclear Issue

Kravchuk: Nukes Belong to CIS

OW1604173993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1727 GMT 16 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In his interview to the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly President Leonid Kravchuk dismissed reports alleging that the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil are not

properly maintained and stored as "crude lies." The president said that in his country the silos are "in no worse shape than they are in Russia."

Kravchuk reiterated his position that Ukraine does not desire to become a nuclear state. Still, he did not agree that the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine are Russian property. "It is the property of the CIS," he insisted.

Kravchuk called for dividing the Black Sea fleet between former Soviet countries having access to the sea. Russia, he said, wants to divide the coastal services, communication hardware, etc. as well as the navy ships. Kiev objects to this approach, Kravchuk said. Like Russia, his country is very sensitive when its territorial integrity is at stake.

'Not A Nuclear State'

AU1104145893 Vienna DER STANDARD in German
10 Apr 93 p 4

[Wolfgang Vogel report: "Ukraine Is No Nuclear State"]

[Text] Kiev—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk keeps all options open concerning the issue of nuclear weapons deployed in his country. In an interview with DER STANDARD, the former leader of the Communist Party hinted that Ukraine will not renounce its nuclear arsenal in the near future: "Politics is one thing, but other aspects, including economic, technological, and military ones are to be taken into consideration too."

Kravchuk cited the strong internal pressure he is exposed to. "The Lvov People's Assembly called on the president to declare that Ukraine is a nuclear state! On the other hand, parliament adopted a resolution stating that Ukraine should gradually become nuclear-free and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."

In a statement, the Russian Government demanded that Ukraine "transfer its nuclear missiles to Russia where they can be destroyed with Ukraine participation." Kravchuk responded that "certain conditions must be fulfilled first. The security of Ukraine must be ensured, and there must be compensation for the destruction of the weapons—economic and financial aid, for example. Only if these conditions are met can this issue be resolved."

Generally, he characterized the position of his country, which has so far not ratified the START I disarmament treaty, much to America's and Russia's irritation, toward nuclear weapons in the following way: "We are not a nuclear state, because only a state that has a nuclear industry can be a nuclear state. We cannot use the nuclear weapons because we do not produce them. For this reason, we advocate the destruction of nuclear weapons—throughout the world."

Kravchuk pointed out that he simply cannot understand the demand by some Russian deputies for a return of the Crimea to Russia. "The Crimea and Sevastopol became part of Ukraine at a certain point in the past on the basis of laws and without the use of force. One must recognize this territorial integrity, otherwise one embarks directly upon the path of confrontation and violence. We do not want that, because Russia and Ukraine are large countries that should coexist peacefully."

Kravchuk angrily rejected predictions that Russia will swallow Ukraine within a year. "These are Western speculations. I am not that familiar with them because I do not read papers that are published abroad. We seek cooperation with Russia, and we can make progress in this way. We will not be swallowed in one year, but rather will be a free country with an expanding economy and secure borders."

Official Spells Out Stance

LD2104150193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 20 Apr 93

[Text] [Announcer] The briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, which took place on 20 April, was devoted to explaining the position of the Ukrainian delegation on issues of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine in the talks with Russia's delegation. Our diplomats were forced to return to this issue by accusations in the Moscow newspapers *IZVESTIYA* and *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA* which distort Ukraine's position regarding nuclear weapons. Here is Anatoliy Komirenko with more details about this:

[Komirenko] Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, head of the Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for Issues of Disarmament and Arms Limitation, noted in his remarks to journalists that almost a month has passed since the last round of talks between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian side desired to reach a compromise at the talks. However, so-called newspaper diplomacy began on Russia's part. Returning to the subject of the talks themselves, Mr. Hryshchenko noted:

[begin Hryshchenko recording] The talks were held on issues of the status of strategic nuclear forces deployed on Ukraine's territory, on issues of utilization of nuclear components which, following the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads, could be used, for example, as fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power stations or in some other way, and on issues of ensuring the nuclear safety of strategic nuclear forces located here.

Ukraine's position is fairly well known, but the main thing is that we would like it to be heard. Unfortunately, it has happened, and is still happening, that we are not heard, and not because they [as heard] cannot hear us, but because they do not want to, because Ukraine's position on these issues is correct, and it is after all fairly difficult to deny this without distortions. [end recording]

[Komirenko] Mr. Hryshchenko went on to emphasize that the nuclear weapons which we inherited from the former Soviet Union were created by the efforts of all the peoples which were part of the Union without regard for the will of the majority of all peoples. After the break-up of the Union, one of the successor states, with equal rights just like the others, insisted and very much wanted to be a nuclear state, and this was Russia.

But proceeding from an analysis of the range of observations, including political, geo-strategic, and economic, the Supreme Council placed Ukraine's intentions to become non-nuclear in the future in the declaration on state sovereignty. The strategic nuclear forces located on our territory were transferred to the operational control of the joint command of strategic forces of the CIS in accordance

with a whole series of inter-state accords. That is, these forces have never been under the jurisdiction of any other state, either legally or in fact.

Russia treats the issue as if it were the only successor of the USSR, in particular regarding nuclear weapons, and it is because of this that strategic forces should be subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Russia. This leads to the fact that there will be foreign troops on Ukraine's territory. Mr. Hryshchenko specially drew the journalists' attention to the following aspect of the matter:

[begin Hryshchenko recording] At the talks our side emphasized that really all materials which are constituents of nuclear weapons are our property, namely materials, namely constituents [as heard]. We do not lay claim to control, to ownership of nuclear warheads, which are meant for only one thing—a nuclear explosion. That is, the quality of nuclear weapons does not interest us here. We are interested in the material part—the utilization of those materials which the people of Ukraine took part in creating and producing, although they themselves did not want to.

In this connection the issue has arisen, and it arises and is still there, on how nuclear and other materials will be utilized, which (?have been removed) and are now being removed from tactical nuclear weapons taken away to Russia in the spring of 1992 for dismantling and destruction. We did not renounce the right of ownership of nuclear materials at any stage. The Russian side is refusing even to discuss this issue. Then doubt really does arise as to what guarantees we will have, even if we agree, about the dismantling of strategic charges [boyezaryady] in Russia, whether there will not be another change of position regarding even discussing this issue. [end recording]

[Komirenko] On the principles of standing up for these interests, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko noted, Ukraine, whatever pressure may be put on it, cannot agree to there being foreign troops on its territory, and cannot agree to signing agreements which would cause it material losses.

Supreme Council Chairman Speaks

LD1504091093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0700 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] Ratification of the START I Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by Ukraine's parliament would happen tomorrow if Ukrainian legislators were to find out today that two important issues had been resolved: on the ownership and on the conversion of nuclear missile units deployed on the territory of the state. This was stated by Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, who is on an official visit to China.

Commenting on the recent expression by a representative of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry on this issue, Plyushch acknowledged that there are political forces in Ukraine that want Ukraine to be a nuclear state. But there are more forces, and I belong to them, observed the chairman of the Supreme Council, that want us and Russia to have significantly better relations than we had previously. Healthy forces, said Ivan Plyushch, do not even think about Ukraine altering its nuclear course and changing its position on the issue of reducing nuclear weapons with their forthcoming elimination and limitation of their proliferation.

The issue is a material one now. Ukraine is nuclear not because of weapons, but because of atomic power units. There is a large quantity of fuel for our atomic electric power stations in missile units. So it is not worth simply giving them away like that, and carrying out conversion. We are saying that conversion of these nuclear units and systems would be carried out at enterprises in Russia. There would be some kind of expenditure as a result of the conversion. We are prepared to remunerate Russia for them, but to receive part of the fuel, said Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, in a press interview while on an official visit to China.

Officers' Union Supports Nuclear Status

LD1104165693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1521 GMT 11 Apr 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaika for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 11 Apr—Participants in the fourth congress of the union of officers of the republic, which ended today, have spoken out in favor of the preservation of Ukraine's nuclear status.

The adopted resolution speaks of the need to "suspend the operation of the Yalta agreement on the Black Sea fleet," to transfer to the reserve all officers "who have not adopted Ukrainian citizenship and those who are openly or secretly holding up the process of the organizational development of the national army." The resolution goes on to say that the congress regards as advisable the introduction in the Army of the institution of chaplaincy and the acceleration of the transition to a state language.

Major General Aleksandr Skipalskiy was elected chairman of the Union of Officers of Ukraine.

Kiev Supports Liquidation Over Transfer

OW1104124993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1228 GMT 11 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Ukraine's fundamental position is to liquidate nuclear arms as a whole gradually, not transfer their separate components to somebody else's territory," the chairman of the special parliamentary commission on preparations for ratifying the START-I treaty, Yuriy Kostenko, told a news conference in Kiev on Saturday [10 April]. The news conference was devoted to the closed session the commission held on Friday.

Kostenko dismissed the allegations that Ukraine is procrastinating the process of ratifying the treaty. The USA considered the treaty for a year and a half, and Russia for seven months, he said.

Kostenko described Washington's and Moscow's policy toward nuclear weapons in Ukraine as "political and economic pressure and blackmail". According to him, the removal of tactical nuclear weapons and their scrapping under the control of Ukrainian observers cannot satisfy Ukraine, since the destiny of the warheads to be dismantled remains unknown.

If Russia continues to delay the supplies of components for missile complexes, "Ukraine might react adequately,"

Kostenko said. Most of the types of missiles Russia is armed with are made in Ukraine, he noted.

According to experts, to scrap strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine will cost 2.8 billion dollars. In the meantime to maintain the missiles and keep them in combat readiness will be much cheaper, said Kostenko.

According to Kostenko, Ukraine's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a denuclearized state, as Russia suggests, would create a situation in which "Ukraine will lose both the right to the weaponry itself and the opportunity to influence its fate".

The schemes for processing warheads into fuel for nuclear-power plants have been worked out technically, he said. However he views the time allocated for this process by Russia - 20 years - as unsatisfactory. Therefore Kostenko believes that it is quite possible for Ukraine to reach an agreement on such processing "with third nuclear countries".

'Mysterious' Fuel Containers Found at Odessa Station

PM1504152993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr 93
First Edition p 6

[Nina Perstneva report: "Fate of Mysterious Containers Clarified"]

[Text] Yesterday's IZVESTIYA (Issue No. 70) published a report about containers with nuclear fuel allegedly detained by the port of Ilichevsk customs service. This report was first confirmed and then denied outright by the customs officers themselves, which gave rise to a mass of all kinds of rumors....

Thus, V. Klinkov, deputy chief of Ilichevsk customs, claimed that they had not seen either containers with a dangerous cargo or any relevant documents. They had simply received operational information about the possible arrival of a special-category cargo, prescribing that it be treated with enhanced attention. As for Customs Chief V. Parfiryev, he altogether denied the fact of the containers' existence.

It was successfully established on the spot that the sensational containers had indeed arrived at the ferry terminal, apparently ending up by mistake there instead of the container terminal. Their tracks were lost after that. In any event, customs officers, who had acquired the numbers of the containers that had arrived at the port, wandered all over their territory but failed to discover the dangerous cargo either at the port or anywhere along the railroad sidings.

According to the latest data received from A. Savelyev, chief of Ilichevsk City Section of the Ukrainian Security Service Odessa Oblast Administration, the four cars carrying not nuclear but rocket fuel, or rather one of the latter's components—ammonium perflorid, are at Odessa-Sortirovochnaya railroad station. The shipper—the "Pavoks" Foreign Economic Association—was sending them from Novorossiysk to Bulgaria. Operational services have long had their eyes on this cargo, requiring special supervision for safety's sake, also because information had been received from the U.S. Embassy in Kiev that the fuel

was destined for Libya. Under the UN Security Council sanctions, such deliveries to this country are banned.

"As far as I know," A. Savelyev said, "talks are going on at the moment with Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this cargo's fate. For the time being it is under special observation at the station."

Customs Service Detains 80 Tonnes of Nuclear Fuel

PM1504103993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Leonid Kapelyushnyy report: "Intended Recipient of Nuclear Freight Still a Mystery"]

[Text] At the port of Ilichevsk the Ukrainian customs service has discovered about 80 tonnes of nuclear fuel in containers. The radioactive freight arrived a few days ago, but is accompanied only by railroad waybills. There are no documents authorizing the export of nuclear fuel.

According to preliminary information, the dangerous freight was dispatched from Russia by a commercial structure. Vyacheslav Klinkov, deputy chief of the customs service in charge of freight inspection, refused to comment on the fact of the presence of nuclear fuel at the port. "It is entirely possible that the dispatcher will submit all the necessary documents any day now, so we would have perturbed public opinion for nothing."

He certainly has a point, but the question is this: What if the dispatcher does not turn up at the port with the documents any day now?

Here is how REUTER interprets the incident. "Ukrainian customs have detained a Russian ship heading for Libya and calling at the Bulgarian port of Varna. On board the ship they found a chemical that can be used to produce missile fuel. Delivery of the chemical to Libya would be a violation of the UN sanctions introduced against the Arab country in 1988 over the 'Lockerbie affair.' Libya is accused of complicity in a bomb explosion on a Pan-Am aircraft which resulted in the death of all passengers and crew members."

Fedorov on Abuses in Secrecy on CW

93WC0045A St. Petersburg CHAS PIK in Russian No 10, 17 Mar 93 pp 1, 10

[Article including interview with Dr. of Chemical Sciences Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov by Viktor Tereshkin under "CHAS PIK Investigation: Secrets of Chemical Warfare" rubric: "Are We Fanning a Chemical Conflagration Everywhere to the Distress of All the Bourgeois?"; date and place not given]

[Text] The military-chemical complex produced hundreds of thousands of metric tons of toxic chemical agents during the years of its existence. Thousands of subjects of the military-chemical complex perished or were crippled at the secret plants. On orders from Moscow, toxic agents were burned, were sunk in the seas, and were buried in the ground. Precisely our military-chemical complex exported this deadly weapon to Iraq, Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Cuba. We are continuing to deceive the world community. The president of the

USSR knew about this. Does the president of Russia suspect this? What lies on the bottom of the Gulf of Finland?

On 22 October of last year, my interlocutor, Dr. of Chemical Sciences Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, was taken along with Vil Mirzayanov, also a doctor of chemical sciences, to Lefortovo Prison. The Ministry of Security of Russia saw the article that they wrote as a dreadful state secret. With this arrest, the Ministry of Security of Russia confirmed that Fedorov and Mirzayanov were telling the truth in the article "Poisoned Politics." The military-chemical complex produced and tested a new binary weapon whose effects are incurable.

[Tereshkin] Lev Aleksandrovich, let us return to the origins of the military-chemical complex. Although I would not want to denigrate such a good word as "origin" by associating it with the military-chemical complex.

[Fedorov] The Bible says: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." To understand what our military-chemical complex is, one must remember that Marshal Tukhachevskiy, so well loved by many, used chemical weapons in putting down the revolt at Kronstadt and then used them to poison the peasants at Tambov who rose up against Soviet authority with weapons in their hands. And here is something else to remember. April of 1989, Tbilisi. And once again there was a marshal but this time it was Yazov. Here are three points of reference. And compared with this, what does it mean to dump a hundred thousand metric tons of munitions into some sea or to bury them in the ground? It is a trifle, especially since one can always find some "specialists" who are very well prepared to explain that the sea and the land will benefit from this.

[Tereshkin] Still, how much toxic material did our valiant chemical complex produce overall?

[Fedorov] In preparing for war with an enemy on foreign territory, the military-chemical complex "fixed" its native land so that it is a matter of full-scale ecological warfare in our own territory, against the land and the water and hence against us—the people living there.

Now for some figures: by 1933, when our chemical generals took over all the experience from the Germans, a central military-chemical test range had already been set up in Shikhany. Here is a most characteristic detail—for the purpose of masking the organization that worked together with the Germans to develop military toxic agents, they called it: joint stock company for pest control and for the application of synthetic fertilizers. As early as 1943, Soviet factories for chemical death were providing about 200,000 tonnes of toxic agents a year.

What was the attitude toward people at these factories?

For the chemical generals, they were just human material to be processed under the slogan: "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!" The plant in Chapayevsk produced yperite [mustard gas] and lewisite throughout the war. And rows of graves grew at the local cemetery. A train brought young boys and girls. In a month and a half or two months, they either died or became invalids. If they tried to refuse, they turned into dust at the camps. It is impossible to cure the damage done by mustard gas. The death rate was such that when they once failed to bring in

manpower the plant had to shut down. This is the price of a chemical warfare. But the generals received 62 orders of Lenin.

According to information that is far from complete, mustard gas was produced at 24 plants, lewisite at 12, and adamsite at 9. And I am just naming those toxic agents that will be our eternal affliction, because they contain arsenic. In military terms, they are ineffective in today's battles. But ecologically they are terrible. According to my calculations, up to 500,000 tonnes of mustard gas alone were produced here.

[Tereshkin] But military "ecologists" intend to destroy just 690 tonnes of mustard gas by the year 2000. Where is the rest of it?

[Fedorov] They buried it, dumped it in the sea, and burned it. And now you have to search for it. And to imagine the geography of the search, here you have it for mustard gas, for example: there were five plants working in Moscow, you had the famous Voskresenskiy Combine and Shchepkovo in the oblast, there were the cities of Yefremov and Aleksin in Tula Oblast, and there was the large Okhtinskiy Combine in your St. Petersburg. Add to that the Omsk and Tomsk combines, Akhsha and Magnitogorsk in Chelyabinsk Oblast, the Bereznikovskiy nitrogen fertilizer plant, Usolye in Siberia—simply a giant, Nizhniy Tagip in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Stalingrad, Dzerzhinsk, Chapayevsk, Kineshma, and Kazan. And then Petrozavodsk. Plus Kirov in Murmansk Oblast. There they are, that is the scope of it. And I do not think that they were concerned about the lives and health of the workers anywhere. [end of interview]

Order: Burn, Sink, Bury.

The first wave of the "salvaging" of the military toxic agents came after the end of the war.

The second wave arrived in the 1960's. This one, the one of the "thaw," was simply a panic. Chapayevsk received a telegram from Chukhnov, then chief of the chemical forces, stating that they were to destroy all stocks of toxic agents at once! Again next to the industrial site they opened up trenches, poured the mustard gas in there, hurriedly sprinkled something on top of it, and covered it up with earth. They proceeded differently with the lewisite bombs. They loaded them on 50 to 60 convoys and sent them directly to the Arctic Ocean. We still have to find out exactly which seas they dumped it in.

The admirals and generals speak of 12 regions where it was dumped. Four of them were in the Baltic Sea, four in northern seas, and four went to seas in the Far East. As of today the "greens" of St. Petersburg and journalists have been able to extract from the military people the coordinates of only 2 of these 12 regions—near Bornholm and Liyepaya.

The last wave—the big one—came at the end of the 1980's. The talks on chemical disarmament were coming to an end and it was clear that our stocks greatly exceeded those of the Americans. This was the source of the figure of 112,523 tonnes of munitions that the CPSU Central Committee planned to dump near Bornholm and Liyepaya using ships from the Kaliningrad and Liyepaya naval bases.

Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov is certain that in addition to the dumping at sea, the military-chemical complex was also still burying toxic agents at the time. Under the Soviet-American agreement, there must be just six to eight bases with a precise and set quantity and list of munitions. Our military people now swear that we have eight bases. Actually bases with chemical weapons were dispersed throughout Russia, not counting those formerly beyond the borders. What happened to the munitions that were there? It was this uncomfortable question—Where are the remaining weapons beyond the declared 40,000?—that Fedorov asked last summer in the newspaper SOVERSHENNO SEKRETN. The chief of the chemical forces Petrov immediately sent a panicky telegram to Shikhany—bury the adamsite at once. From Shikhany—our central test range where the elite of the chemical forces serve—they answered: yes, sir. And they buried it. No inspection from America will help us here. America is truly frightened by new generations of weapons and the government there has allocated millions of dollars to destroy them. Our ecological troubles from the submerged and buried old chemical weapons will be far away from the States.

How They Are Cultivating a Chemical "Sham" for the West

According to the information of Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, they have been falsifying documents throughout the empire of the military-chemical complex since 1988. Why is this necessary? Because if the old production documentation is raised, it will be easy to reestablish the true volumes of weapons produced. For example, the Volgograd plant began production of soman back at the beginning of the 1960's and continued it for 25 years. At the hearings in parliament, however, the military people declared: our stocks of soman amount to just 5,000 tonnes, which are now being presented for international inspections. This is incomparable.

The list of munitions is still another lie. In October 1987, they invited correspondents to Shikhany and the military, painstakingly demonstrating their openness under perestroika, showed the journalists 19 types of chemical munitions, including 6 with yperite (projectiles of rocket and cannon artillery, bombs) and one with CS gas (grenades). But none of this is in the chemical disarmament program now before the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It has completely disappeared. The generals were especially assiduous about hiding grenades with CS, because the army used them in Tbilisi in 1989. The announced list does not include any bombs with V-gas, just bombs and rockets. But there is evidence—this was reported in the press of Cheboksary—that the depot that burned in Novocheboksary was precisely the depot with bombs loaded with V-gas. Fedorov carried out his own investigation and the workers who remember everything because they made the munitions with V-gas with their own hands told him that there were 2-tonne liquid canisters for helicopters and 45-kg parachute bombs as well as fragmentation bombs of 160-170 kg each and other bombs of 240-260 kg, from which a toxic agent was dispersed. None of this was in our documents that we presented at the international conference! They will yet expose us for this.

How They Are Confusing Us

The first meager information about the dumping in the Baltic came out in the winter of 1992. Then there was almost a flood that hit the front pages of the newspapers by the summer. At one time it seemed that the "green" party of St. Petersburg and the journalists would pressure the government and it would finally issue a directive on the beginning of an expedition to investigate two dumping regions under the "Ekobaros" program. This program was elaborated by the St. Petersburg association "Okeanotekhnika." But the summer passed and the government, after having approved "Ekobaros" in all ministries, failed to give its consent to the expedition. It is now clear that this powerful military-chemical complex applied all the brakes.

But the representatives of the military-chemical complex took very successful action, publishing a statement that all chemical weapons on the bottom of the Baltic have long since been neutralized and that there is no reason to spread panic here. Then another theme came into vogue: it was important to smear "Okeanotekhnika" and this was done.

The most distinguishing publication on this was the article "Yperite," an entire page in the October issue of ST. PETERSBURG VEDOMOSTI. The old performer of delicate assignments Igor Borisovich Lisochkin interviewed the previously absolutely secret scientist Yevgeniy Andreyevich Sivolodskiy, a professor, doctor of sciences, chemist, Hero of Socialist Labor, and winner of the Lenin and state prizes.

The lion's share of the material was dedicated to mustard gas, which the future professor made at that same plant in Chapayevsk. Just as a missile with a multiple reentry vehicle is supposed to destroy several targets, this material performed multiple functions. The basic task was to state that the journalists writing about the threat from the submerged chemical weapons are lying and that only the chemical forces can be brought in to investigate the deposits. "No joint teams must be allowed within the range of a cannon. Otherwise we will end up with the usual trickery."

I can imagine the efforts that went into the preparation of this "brick" and how many screens were used to sift the information. But as hard as they tried, there is something the boys failed to see.

It follows from the text that not only toxic agents but also liquid chemical explosive substances—"panclastites"—were dumped in the Baltic. They not only can explode but also can cause burns and the rapid development of emphysema. Even before the war, our glorious Technological Institute had special departments, one of which worked on the synthesis of military toxic agents. Until this day Prof. Anatoliy Nikitovich Lavrentyev, an "outstanding" specialist in this area who is head of the department for biologically active substances (remember the pest control company?), has been working at the Technological Institute. The lecturer at the State Institute for Applied Chemistry D.D. Moldavskiy also told me that the professor is a star of the first magnitude on the "poisonous horizon." In December 1991, he gave to the conversion commission of the St. Petersburg Council descriptive information on the substances that could be dumped to the bottom of the

Baltic. So thanks for the science, professor. Now the city dwellers know from where to expect trouble.

The Ministry of Security Is Stretching Its Muscles

"What happened to us was political persecution," Fedorov thinks. "By the way, it was the first since August 1991."

A few words about the motives causing two scientists to reach for the pen. Vil Mirzayanov was head of technical counterintelligence at his institute. Around that same Volgograd plant he was supposed to take measurements and make sure that the concentrations of chemical substances are so low that no Western spy would understand what this plant is involved with. Of course Mirzayanov knew what some concentration or other of a toxic agent can do to the organism of an adult or child. Mirzayanov discovered that the maximum permissible concentration was being exceeded by a factor in the hundreds. In that case, what is the use of thinking about foreign spies? Here it is necessary to save our people who live nearby. He came to the institute management with this. The rest is clear.

Several years ago, Fedorov by himself began to fight against the danger of dioxine. And he soon understood that this superpoison had poisoned the land and water near the plants producing chemical weapons and that the barriers of secrecy had gone up around dioxine because the military-chemical complex is developing it as a chemical weapon.

Back on 10 October 1991, in an article published in KURANTY, Mirzayanov wrote that the experimental-industrial production of a new toxic substance has been organized in our country. When they interrogated Fedorov in October 1992, he asked the investigator how he could have been sleeping for an entire year. We had difficulties at the time, he answered evasively. Understandable difficulties: after August 1991, State Security was not concerned about Mirzayanov. Their own survival was at stake. And now that the KGB has escaped and changed its sign, it is showing who is boss in this country.

The article "Poisoned Politics" came out in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on 20 September 1992. Mirzayanov and Fedorov were not taken to Lefortovo until 22 October. What difficulties did the people at the MBR [Ministry of Security of Russia] have this time? This is how Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov explains this:

"On the day when MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published our article, Vil and I sent the same material to the American newspaper BALTIMORE SUN. This city is the location of the oldest military chemical base in the United States and for this reason the inhabitants of Baltimore are very familiar with these problems. But the newspaper did not publish our article. Instead it carried out its own journalistic investigation and printed it within a month. This material on chemical weapons in Russia did indeed include secret information. With this comment: according to anonymous sources. The article came out on Sunday, 18 October. On the 19th, our civilian foreign "experts" recovered their senses and on the 20th orders were issued for our arrest. The MBR was won over, deciding that Vil and I were these anonymous sources.

What is now happening has already exceeded all bounds. They have continued to interrogate Mirzayanov even after 13 January 1993. But it was on the 13th in Paris when on behalf of Russia Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This is not the first time in the history of our internal affairs agencies that we have had this crass dullness. In the fall of 1941, when the Germans blockaded Leningrad and stood before Moscow, the slow millstones of the state security machinery were still "grinding up" those accused of having an anti-German disposition.

The MBR is now removing all experts on the side of Fedorov and Mirzayanov. To this day neither a lawyer nor the accused has looked at the list of secrets that cannot be divulged. What kind of trial will this be, where neither Mirzayanov nor his lawyer will know what is involved?

Vil Mirzayanov spent 12 days in Lefortovo Prison. He was in cell No. 41. Bukovskiy once sat in cell No. 42. When Vil came out, he joked bitterly:

"Lefortovo has been repaired. Everything is brand new and shining. So, democrats, everything is ready to receive you!"

Does Father Czar Know What the Boyars Are Doing?

On 21 November of last year, IZVESTIYA published documents of the CPSU Central Committee with the stamp "Top Secret." At one of its meetings in February 1989, the Politburo tried to ascertain "which specific chemicals and chemical equipment we were providing to Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Cuba, whether these countries were being given any assistance in the establishment or operation of facilities capable of producing chemical weapons, under which programs were foreign officers-chemists being trained in the Soviet Union, and how it happened that we helped the Libyans to build an air defense facility that was intended for the production of chemical weapons." In their impotence and ignorance, the leaders of the country, including Gorbachev, signed off on it. The monster military-chemical complex was beyond the control of the Kremlin and had begun to spread across the globe.

A year ago, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin made a confession in a conversation with a theater director. It was published in IZVESTIYA. The essence of the disclosure: experts had been deceiving him, saying that bacteriological weapons were not being developed in Russia. Yeltsin was forced to carry out his own investigation and only then was he able to find out that the military people were lying. The Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons signed by our country is already 20 years old. As a matter of fact, work with anthrax was proceeding at full speed. It is now time for the president of Russia to carry out a new investigation: has the Moloch of the military-chemical complex been stopped or is it still developing and stockpiling new and more and more powerful kinds of weapons?

Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov is certain that the generals are trying harder to camouflage themselves, preparing for a chemical war under the conditions of their prohibition. This is the focus that they have become accustomed to

over the 20 years of the prohibition of bacteriological warfare. And they are carrying out training in institutes and at bases and plants in the event of a visit by international inspectors. And that same directorate of the Defense Ministry General Staff that planned an offensive chemical war has been renamed Directorate for Ecology and Special Protective Systems.

One should also listen to the person who was one of the developers of a new generation of chemical weapons. Vladimir Uglev, senior scientific associate of the Volk branch of the State Union Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, asserts that as early as the beginning of the 1980's many specialists dealing with the problem of chemical weapons were expressing the opinion: the creation and stockpiling of more and more new kinds of chemical weapons by a nuclear power is not only redundant and senseless but also criminal, because ultimately the accumulated stocks will have to be destroyed.

What Secrets Are Kept by Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland

"Bornholm and Liyepaya are far from us," I once heard in the course of this journalistic investigation, "if all of these bombs begin to leak at the same time, it still will not reach St. Petersburg."

It was naive to think that such a preserve of the military-chemical complex as our cradle of three revolutions will not be soiled by chemical dirt.

On one of the days when a manuscript of another investigation—on the patch of radioactive contamination in Shkiperskiy Channel, where they "forged" weapons on the basis of military radioactive substances, an older person with an army demeanor showed up at the editor's office. He came to invite me to an ecological meeting but he managed to see the headline of the article and suddenly admitted:

"I also worked at Shkiperka but our main proving ground was on the island of Konevits on Ladoga."

That is how it came out that at Shkiperskiy Channel of Vasilyevskiy Island they dealt not only with radioactive but also with chemical weapons. And also with ways to protect against them. It is apparent that the people there were of great intellect, for they thought of putting the chemical proving grounds on the island of Konevits and the range for the testing of radioactive weapons among the rocks above Priozersk. They did not think about the fact that they themselves drink water from Ladoga and that their children and grandchildren will have to drink.

On the island of Konevitz, they worked with sarin, soman, and tabun. Somewhere in the area adamsite must remain in the soil. It lay there in piles, remembered a gray-haired retiree. Projectiles with toxic agents were exploded on the island and military people watched how they affected experimental animals. The solutions—for chemical and radioactive substances (they experimented with them as well)—were dumped directly into Lake Ladoga.

There is information to the effect that in the summer of 1960 there was a depot of old chemical bombs in the forest near the village of Koporye on the shore of the Gulf of Finland. The area of the depot was 4 square kilometers.

The structures there were already beginning to leak. And then some of them were shot up so that the toxic agents could flow out into trenches. Where did this chemical death go and what underground layers were infiltrated? But the largest part of the bombs was removed somewhere within a year. Where to?

As was learned from Viktor Konstantinovich Ryzhkov, chief of the St. Petersburg specialized state inspectorate for the conservation of the sea and adjacent waterways of the region, there are three places in the Gulf of Finland where munitions have been dumped. Ryzhkov inquired about this at the command of our naval base. The acting Chief of Staff Skrypnik answered that one such place is located to the north of the Island of Nerva, another is to the north of Tolbukhin Lighthouse, and a third is to the northeast of this same lighthouse. Precise coordinates are in IZVESHCHENIYE MOREPLAVATELYAM NA BALTIYSKOM MORE, No. 2, 7 January 1982. There was one phrase in

the response from Skrypnik that was particularly displeasing to Ryzhkov: "The Leningrad Naval Base has no information on the time of the burial or its volumes and characteristics."

Our Finnish neighbors should remember the coordinates of the dump near the Island of Nerva—this is 17 km from the national sea boundary, latitude 60 degrees 17 minutes, longitude 27 degrees 57 minutes, and the depth there is from 46 to 58 meters.

The workers of the military-chemical complex created weapons and believed that the Motherland needs this. The generals received decorations, and now they have found warm places and are dealing with "ecology" and "conventional problems." And the generals will never tell the truth: where and what weapons did they bury, develop, and dump. For this reason, I appeal to those who can divert a chemical Chernobyl from our home and to those who remember and understand. I implore you to respond! Before it is too late, it is necessary to draw up a chart of where chemical death lies in wait of its hour "X."

DENMARK

Businessmen Offered 'Mysterious' Materials From Former USSR

BR1504142493 Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUEL
in Danish 14 Apr p 4

[Report by Jens Grund: "Mysterious Substances From East"]

[Text] Last year the Riso National Laboratory had six or seven inquiries from people who had been offered so-called "red mercury" from the former Soviet Union.

According to Max Kristiansen, CEO and sales manager of Johnson Matthey, a company located in Bronshøj that deals in precious and base metals, a large number of Danish businessmen are being offered more or less mysterious raw materials from the collapsed Soviet bloc.

The businessmen in question turn to Johnson Matthey to find out whether there is a market for such substances and what their value is.

"There are all kinds of substances coming out of Russia. Some of them most probably are stolen. When the businessmen are offered these substances, they call us to find out whether we are interested," says Kristiansen.

Among the substances offered to these businessmen are raw materials like rubidium or cesium.

"We cannot imagine what cesium could be used for," says Max Kristiansen. "Danish commercial agents have asked us what the substances supposedly are used for. Our answer is: 'That is for you to say. After all, it is you who want to sell it.'"

According to Riso, a Danish wine merchant was offered cesium in return for wine. Another company was offered the same substance in payment for deep-frozen goods, say the police.

"The whole Soviet system has collapsed. As you can imagine, the people there are trying to sell anything of value," says Leif Sonderberg Petersen, Riso's information manager.

Riso has been approached by roughly 20 businessmen who have been offered one substance or another originating from the former Soviet Union.

Six or seven of these cases involved companies which had been offered so-called "red mercury." Apparently, on the international black market, this substance is reputed to be of use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The businessmen want to know what the substance can be used for and what it is worth. "However, the powder is absolutely worthless," says Leif Sonderberg Petersen.

The raw materials osmium, originating from the Urals, and rubidium also have been analyzed by Riso at the request of a businessman who was offered the substances for sale.

"The substances in question can be cheap or expensive. It would seem that some people are trying to sell them without even attempting to find out what their clients actually need. These are not normal chemical transactions," according to B. Skytte Jensen, adviser at Riso's

chemical department. As he puts it: "The fear is that we will become less vigilant and that as a result hazardous substances indeed will find their way into Denmark."

NORWAY

'Liberal' Heavy Water Export Controls Viewed

93EN0340ZA Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
3 Apr 93 p 13

[Article by Harald Stanghelle: "Norway Has Made the World Less Safe"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Norway has sold nearly 450 metric tons of heavy water on the world's nuclear market. Norwegian authorities have never been especially meticulous about making demands on recipients.

Heavy water has been produced at Norsk Hydro's heavy water plant at Rjukan continuously since its small beginnings early in the 1930's up to its closing in 1989.

Heavy water is essential as a moderator, or braking medium, in certain types of nuclear reactors. In itself, it is innocent enough; it is not heavy water which is used in developing a nuclear weapon. However, when a heavy water reactor is operating, a portion of the uranium in the fuel rods eventually changes into plutonium. This can be discharged and used as fission material in nuclear weapons. It is this potential that has made heavy water so much in demand by states who wish to develop an atomic weapon.

Heavy water stemming from Rjukan has played an important role in the development of nuclear weapons in several nations, say international nonproliferation experts.

"Norway has made the world less safe. Half of all Norwegian heavy water production since 1945 has been used in nuclear weapons programs," said Prof. Gary Milhollin, leader of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN in February.

What he and other nonproliferation experts point out is that while countries such as the United States and Canada are much more stringent when it comes to exporting heavy water, Norway has conducted a both liberal and lax policy.

As late as 1986, the Norwegian authorities issued export permits for heavy water [while the authorities in the United States] and Canada said a flat "no." The Norwegian trade bureaucracy had never had the custom of asking probing questions or being suspicious, even when it concerned the export of nuclear materials.

Professor Milhollin named three countries which greatly benefited from this "largesse": France, Israel, and India. All three developed nuclear weapons in spite of international opposition. All three were dependent upon the import of heavy water from sources which did not make stringent demands.

When France began its move to produce a nuclear weapon, the United States required such strict control over what use the heavy water the French were buying would be put to, that it was impossible to misuse it. That brought the French nuclear buyers to Oslo:

"Norway demanded no such disagreeable inspections, and we can document the fact that Norwegian heavy water was used when France developed its nuclear weapon," said Milhollin.

France bought 151 metric tons of heavy water, according to Norsk Hydro's own statistics. Given that the total production was just 450 metric tons, it says something about how much the French had need of. Neither in the case of France nor other nations were the Norwegian authorities concerned about what the heavy water was being used for:

"Up until the middle of the 1950's the Norwegian authorities had never had second thoughts about heavy water being used for anything but peaceful purposes," it said in a review of the heavy water affair done by the Ministry of Trade in December 1987. But even after that time, they felt no qualms about it. A letter dated 29 December 1962, from Foreign Affairs Minister Hallvard Lange to members of the government, stated that "guarantees concerning the peaceful use of heavy water exported to certain Western lands should not be demanded." What lay behind the letter was the fact that Norsk Hydro wished to sell 90 metric tons of heavy water to France.

In other cases, it was with open eyes [words illegible]. In the case of Israel, the sale was also discussed within the government. The records from that time show the government was aware that heavy water could be misused and imposed conditions that Norwegian experts should inspect its use in Israel. In 1961, an inspection was made which showed that the heavy water had not been used. Afterwards, the Norwegian authorities "forgot" about their right to inspection and the matter did not surface until 1986 when it was revealed that Israel had long ago acquired the atom bomb—with Norwegian help.

Norwegian heavy water has been important on the black market, as well. In 1983, a German businessman, Alfred Hempel, inveigled the Norwegian authorities to sell him 15 metric tons of heavy water. Officially, it was to be used in Hempel's homeland, but the whole shipment was flown to Bombay, India. Some 12.5 metric tons of heavy water purchased by the Romanians in 1986 went to the same address. Officially, the Romanians were to use it in a projected nuclear power plant. In reality, the Norwegian heavy water went directly into India's atomic program and brought the Ceausescu regime badly needed Western cash. Once again Norway undercut its official nonproliferation policy.

In connection with this story it may be added that Canada refused to sell to Romania under the same conditions to which Norway consented.

This issue continues to be a sticky point in Norwegian-Indian relations: Despite concrete evidence from Romania, India steadfastly denies having received any heavy water.

Many have pointed out the paradox that while Norway has taken a very strict stance on the issue of nonproliferation

of nuclear weapons, it has conducted a liberal and lax policy with regard to the very sensitive heavy water.

"It is a condition of international involvement in this sphere that our own doorstep be well swept," wrote Johan Jorgen Holst, under secretary in that period, in an introduction to the study done by the [words illegible].

SWEDEN

Report on Construction of New Submarine 2000

LD1704125793 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network
in Swedish 1030 GMT 17 Apr 93

[Excerpts] No country in the world is building as many new submarines as Sweden, and therefore we can invest heavily in the export of these weapons systems. Kockums in Malmoe is now building three units which are included in the latest order from the Navy, and at the same time the Defense Materiel Administration is studying the next generation of submarines.

[Unidentified correspondent] Few countries in the world have such an advanced submarine knowhow as Sweden. Submarine surveillance has the ear of the politicians, and resources are invested on the continuing development of new types of submarines.

A submarine is the defense forces' most advanced surveillance weapon and the cost comes accordingly. The unit price for the three submarines now being built at Kockums in Malmoe is 1 billion Swedish kronor. This submarine series is technically so perfect that the main demand for the next generation of submarines, Submarine 2000, is that it should be cheaper. [passage omitted]

It is industrial politics that have mainly dictated the decisions to manufacture only a few new submarines at a time instead of a bigger batch of the same type of submarines. Submarine 2000 is made in two basic models: one spool-shaped simple-body submarine, and one a flatter, double-body vessel which looks like a flounder, the like of which has not yet been seen. What these two models have in common is the low noise with soft-rounded shapes, which means that sonic echoes do not resound and the submarine can avoid detection.

The starting point for the work at the Defense Materiel Administration is to find the most cost effective combination of smooth techniques, silent operation, weapons capacity, and the ability to stay under water for long periods. [passage omitted]

In two year's time, the politicians will have the basis to decide whether Submarine 2000 is to be a project. Everything points to an affirmative result of the assessment.

Taking care of submarine knowhow and the central place of the submarines in our defenses against an invasion have so far meant continuing reorders. The Swedish Navy currently has submarines in the highest world class, whereas the German submarine fleet in comparison has not been renewed in the last 25 years.

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6 Mar 1993